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Abstract
I show that conventional estimators based on the consumption Euler equation, exten-
sively used in studies of intertemporal consumption behavior, produce inconsistent estimates
of the eﬀect of children on consumption if potentially binding credit constraints are ignored.
As a more constructive contribution, I supply a tractable approach to obtaining bounds on
the eﬀect of children and a structural estimation strategy when households face constraints.
Finally, I estimate the eﬀect of children on consumption using the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) for the US and high quality Danish administrative register data. Re-
sults suggest that children does not aﬀect household consumption in the same magnitude
previously assumed.
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1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the eﬀect of children on non-durable consumption over the life
cycle. The empirical age proﬁle of household consumption forms an inverse u-shape (hump) and
the average number of children shares this proﬁle leading to the intuitive reasoning that children
are likely to increase household consumption. The same consumption proﬁle can, however, be
rationalized by income growth and credit constraints with very diﬀerent policy implications. If
imperfect markets such as constraints on credit are the main driver of the observed consumption
behavior, reducing these imperfections would increase welfare. On the contrary, if the consump-
tion behavior is due to children, resources are simply redistributed within households towards
periods with a higher marginal value of consumption and no political intervention is needed. The
extent to which children aﬀect consumption behavior has, therefore, received great attention the
last two decades with large eﬀects of children on consumption being the most common ﬁnding.1
The present study oﬀers four signiﬁcant contributions to this literature. First, I show how
conventional methods, used intensively in the literature on intertemporal consumption behavior,
produce inconsistent estimates of the eﬀect of children on consumption if consumers face possibly
binding credit constraints. This inconsistency of the eﬀect of children has, to the best of my
knowledge, not been documented before and, if ignored, pose a serious problem when analyzing
intertemporal consumption behavior.2 Secondly, I supply a tractable approach to obtaining
bounds on the eﬀect of children. Thirdly, I propose the use of a structural estimation strategy
and, Finally, I estimate the eﬀect of children on consumption using the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) for the US and high quality Danish administrative register data.
There is both a positive and negative directed bias of Euler equation estimators of the eﬀect
of children on consumption. Speciﬁcally, if the eﬀect of children on consumption is large, the
credit constraint likely restrain households from increasing consumption as much as what would
have be desired had (additional) borrowing been possible. Imagine an extreme case where a
household has so few resources that consumption tracks income perfectly in the early part of life
since borrowing is not allowed. At the arrival of a child, the credit constraint forces household
expenditure to be unaﬀected even if such a household would want to increase consumption in
the presence of children, producing a downward bias. To the contrary, if the eﬀect of children
is relatively low, conventional methods will over estimate the eﬀect of children. The reason is
that, even if children does not aﬀect consumption, early life income growth together with the
credit constraint produce a positive correlation between consumption growth and changes in
household demographics because children often arrive while households are young and aﬀected
by credit constraints the most.
I suggest a tractable approach to uncover bounds on the eﬀect of children when credit
1Thurow (1969) might be one of the ﬁrst studies investigating the age proﬁle of consumption to mention both
children and constraints as potential explanations for the hump. Some important contributions to the literature
on the eﬀect of children are due to Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985); Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994);
Attanasio and Weber (1995); Attanasio and Browning (1995); Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber (1999);
Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) and Browning and Ejrnæs (2009).
2The fact that ignoring credit constraints produce biased Euler equation estimates is not new. Adda and
Cooper (2003) show how Euler equation estimation of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is upwards
biased if credit constraints are ignored. However, how ignored constraints aﬀect the estimated eﬀect of children
on consumption has not been thoroughly analyzed.
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constraints might aﬀect consumers. Utilizing the opposite directed biases and using simple
reduced form methods with suitable instruments, I argue that young households together with
suitable instruments can be used to uncover an upper bound while older households can be used
to estimate a lower bound.
Additionally, I propose a ﬂexible structural estimation strategy in which the economic en-
vironment of households is fully speciﬁed and the resulting model is solved numerically. This
method relies on more structure but overcomes limitations of the bounds estimation approach
allowing for measurement error in key variables, simultaneous estimation of all relevant struc-
tural parameters, and arbitrary number, age and scale eﬀect of children on consumption. The
general estimation framework does not rely on availability of panel data and the approach is,
therefore, extremely useful since repeated cross section data, which most surveys are, can be
used to estimate parameters of interest in this framework.
Finally, I estimate the eﬀect of children on consumption using both the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) and high quality Danish administrative register data. Results suggest, for both
data sources, that the eﬀect of children is lower than previously assumed in the literature.3 The
estimated bounds suggest that what is typically reported in the literature is close to the upper
bound, while I estimate eﬀects close to the lower bound, using the proposed structural estimation
approach. The PSID contains only food consumption measures but Blundell, Pistaferri and
Preston (2008) imputes total non-durable consumption for PSID households based on food
consumption in the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) which I use. The Danish register
data contain information on household income and wealth along with household characteristics
providing high quality longitudinal information, compared to the more noisy recall survey data
in the PSID.4
In stark contrast to what I ﬁnd, it seems broadly accepted that children play an important
role in generating the observed consumption proﬁles. In an inﬂuential study by Attanasio, Banks,
Meghir and Weber (1999), the number of children is found to be important in order to describe
the consumption behavior of US consumers, using the CEX. This is supported by the results
in Attanasio and Browning (1995) using the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES). Fernández-
Villaverde and Krueger (2007) argue that around 50 percent of the hump in the consumption
proﬁle in the CEX is due to household demographics while Browning and Ejrnæs (2009) argue
that the number and age of children can explain completely the hump in consumption. All
existing studies apply Euler equation estimation techniques ignoring potentially binding credit
constraints. If the eﬀect of children is relatively low ignoring credit constraints produce a positive
bias in Euler equation estimators oﬀering a potential explanation for why existing empirical
studies ﬁnd large eﬀects of children on consumption.
Credit constraints cannot be ruled out to aﬀect consumers. Recent research suggest that
observed behavior of especially young consumers is likely due to households being credit con-
strained (Leth-Petersen, 2010). The empirical importance of constraints are, however, still an
3For some speciﬁcations, I estimate an eﬀect of children on consumption close to the estimate in Attanasio,
Banks, Meghir and Weber (1999) for US consumers. The estimates are, however, not statistically signiﬁcant and
produce average consumption proﬁles that do not ﬁt the data as well as a model in which children does not aﬀect
consumption.
4Runkle (1991) ﬁnds that more than 70 percent of the variation in changes in log food consumption in the
PSID is measurement error.
2
open question since testing for the presence of credit constraints is an extremely challenging task
due to the unobservable shadow prices of additional resources. In fact, if there is no constraints
on credit but instead a probability of a very low income (zero income in unemployment, say)
many of the results in the present study still holds. This is because the combination of income
growth, risk averse consumers, and a probability of a very low income induce a self-imposed
credit constraint and consumer behavior very similar to that of consumers facing an explicit
credit constraint.
The richness of the present model framework, in which the age and number of children
may aﬀect household preferences, has previously precluded structural estimation of the eﬀect of
children on consumption. When the inﬂuential study by Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber
(1999) investigated the eﬀect of children, it was an achievement to even simulate data from their
model. Due to signiﬁcant improvements of computers and computational techniques, I am able
to formulate a similar model and estimate all structural parameters.5
The next section describes the conventional Euler equation estimators of the eﬀect of chil-
dren on consumption and show in a simple four-period model, with an analytical solution, how
potentially binding credit constraints induce an omitted variable bias and use this bias to un-
cover bounds of the eﬀect of children on consumption. Section 3 formulates a life cycle model
of household consumption in the presence of children and credit constraints and Section 4 con-
ﬁrms the results from the four-period model through a Monte Carlo study. Section 5 provides
an alternative structural estimation approach to uncovering all structural parameters including
the eﬀect of children on consumption. Section 6 apply the structural estimation approach and
report estimated eﬀects of children on consumption using both Danish register data and the
PSID along with estimated bounds using only the Euler equation. Finally, Section 7 concludes
with a discussion.
2 Euler Equation Estimation of the Eﬀect of Children
All existing studies, to the best of my knowledge, analyzing the eﬀect of children on household
consumption, apply estimators based on the consumption Euler equation. The standard Euler
equation does, however, not hold if households are potentially credit constrained. This is well
known and Adda and Cooper (2003) show how Euler equation estimation of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is upwards biased if credit constraints are ignored. I show that ignored
credit constraints also produce inconsistent estimates of the eﬀect of children on consumption
when conventional Euler equation estimation techniques are applied. Further, I exploit this
inconsistency to estimate bounds of the eﬀect of children.
5Speciﬁcally, I utilize the Endogenous Grid Method (EGM), proposed by Carroll (2006). This method solves
consumption models, as the one in the present study, extremely fast as documented in Jørgensen (2013).
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Following Rendahl (forthcoming), the constrained Euler equation is
u′(Ct)v(zt; θ)− λt = RβEt
[
u′(Ct+1)v(zt+1; θ)− λt+1
]
⇓
Rβ
u′(Ct+1)
u′(Ct)
v(zt+1; θ)
v(zt; θ)
= 1,t+1 + 2,t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡t+1
, (1)
where Et[·] denotes expectations conditional on information available in period t, λs is the shadow
price of resources in period s, R is the real gross interest rate, β is the discount factor, Ct denotes
consumption, u(·) is the utility function, assumed to be constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
with risk aversion parameter, ρ. v(zt+1; θ) is a taste shifter in which zt contains variables
describing household demographics and θ is their loadings such that θ is the parameter vector
that smooths marginal utility across periods with changing household composition. Unless
otherwise stated, as is standard in the literature, v(zt; θ) = exp(θ#kidst). The structural Euler
residual, s, satisfy
Et[1,t+1] = 1,
2,t+1 = −λt −RβEt[λt+1]
u′(Ct)v(zt; θ)
.
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions we know that λt ≥ 0 and λt(Mt − Ct + κPt) = 0 in all
time periods. Hence, if agents know with perfect certainty that the borrowing constraint will not
bind in any period, we have that Et[t+1] = 1. Generally, however, consumers are not certain
that they will be unaﬀected by constraints and the mean expectational error in (1) is a function
of information today,
Et[t+1] = f(Ct, zt) 6= 1,
and serially correlated through the presence of λt and λt+1 in 2,t+1. In the existing litera-
ture on intertemporal consumption allocation and the eﬀect of children on consumption, credit
constraints are eﬀectively ignored or assumed away.
Ignoring potentially binding credit constraints (i.e., assuming that λs = 0 ∀s), a non-linear
GMM estimator of θ could be
θGMM = argmin
θ
[
1
NT
N∑
i
T∑
t
(
Rβ
(
Ci,t+1
Ci,t
)−ρ
exp(θ∆zi,t+1)− 1
)
· Zi,t+1
]2
, (2)
such that θGMM is the parameter that satisfy the sample equivalent of E[(− 1)′Z] = 0, where
Z contain instrument(s) assumed uncorrelated with the Euler residual. Ignoring measurement
error, the estimator in (2) produce consistent estimates as long as a suitable instrument is
available and, importantly, households does in fact not face credit constraints. Alan, Attanasio
and Browning (2009) supply modiﬁed GMM estimators to allow for measurement error while still
ignoring possibly binding credit constraints. The results will transfer directly to more realistic
settings in which consumption is observed with measurement error.
Using food consumption from the PSID, Alan, Attanasio and Browning (2009) estimate the
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eﬀect of children to be around .18 from a similar estimator as (2) and as large as .9 using
estimators allowing for measurement error in consumption.6 Dynan (2000), also using the PSID
and a GMM estimator, estimates almost as large eﬀects of children of around θ ≈ .7.
Most existing studies work with a log-linearized version of the Euler equation resulting in
the estimable equation
∆ logCit = constant + ρ
−1θ′∆zit + ˜it, (3)
in which the ﬁrst term is a constant as a function of structural parameters (β, ρ) and the interest
rate (assumed constant), the second term is the eﬀect of children and the last term is a reduced
form residual, ˜ = −ρ−1 log . Instruments such as lagged changes in number of children or
cohort-average number of children are typically used to circumvent endogeneity of the interest
rate and children.
In the inﬂuential study by Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber (1999), θ and ρ is uncovered
by estimating a log-linearized Euler equation using lagged changes in z as instruments along with
lagged changes in income and consumption. The eﬀect of the number of children is found to be
around θ ≈ .33 using the CEX. Several studies have used the PSID to estimate versions of the
log-linearized Euler equation, see, e.g., Hall and Mishkin (1982); Runkle (1991) and Lawrance
(1991). The latter reports estimates suggesting a value of θ of around 0.5. Browning and Ejrnæs
(2009) allow for a more ﬂexible functional form of v(zt; θ) when estimating the eﬀect of children
on log consumption growth using the FES and argue that the number and age of children can
explain completely the hump in consumption.
Some empirical studies recognize that credit constraints might aﬀect household behavior.
Often, potentially binding credit constraints are handled by discarding households in which
nothing is carried over from period t to t + 1 (see, e.g., Alan, Attanasio and Browning, 2009).
This strategy is clearly not a satisfactory approach because households expectations about the
possibility of the credit constraint being binding in future periods (Et[λt+1]) still aﬀect present
consumption behavior. Determining at which level of wealth households are completely free of
the credit constraint is non-trivial.
Other estimators have been proposed to estimate Euler equations. For example, Alan and
Browning (2010) propose a method in which they fully parametrize the Euler residuals and simu-
late these residuals and consumption paths simultaneously. Their Synthetic Residual Estimation
(SRE) procedure does, like most other methods, not allow for credit constraints in a coherent
way. Since the GMM and log-linearized estimation methods are the conventional methods used
in the literature, I focus exclusively on these. I conjecture, however, that all conclusions would
carry directly to other alternative estimation methods, as SRE, that does not handle credit
constraints and other potential life cycle motives in a structured way.
Estimation of log-linearized Euler equation has been discussed intensively in the literature.
For example, Carroll (2001) argues that estimation of ρ using a log-linearized Euler equation
suﬀers from an omitted variable bias if consumers face income uncertainty. Attanasio and Low
6They use the lagged changes in number of children, ∆zt, as instrument and the estimates are very imprecise.
Since the change in the number of children inside a given household is a very persistent series, the large and
imprecise estimates might be due to the use of a weak instrument. I ﬁnd in the Monte Carlo study below
indications of a weak instrument problem using lagged changes in household-speciﬁc number of children. Using
the change in birth cohort average number of children as instrument produce better results.
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(2004) argue, however, in favor of Euler equation estimation arguing that the critique in Carroll
(2001) is unwarranted in practice. I ignore any considerations on this discussion and assume, for
the ease of exposition, that researchers know all other parameters except the eﬀect of children
on consumption, θ.
The present exposition of the inconsistency of previously applied estimators is, therefore,
based on the absolutely best of all circumstances in which i) a panel of consumers is available,
ii) consumption is observed without measurement error, iii) researchers know the underlying
model consumers solve, and iv) researchers know the preferences of consumers except the eﬀect
of children on consumption. Even in these unrealistically good circumstances, I will show that
ignoring potentially binding credit constraints will produce inconsistent estimates of the eﬀect of
children on household consumption using both the exact Euler equation (2) or the log-linearized
Euler equation (3).
This has not been discussed or documented before and pose a serious problem when estimat-
ing the eﬀect of children on consumption since the estimators described above does not easily
generalize to the case when households face possibly binding credit constraints. Before turn-
ing to a full structural life cycle model of intertemporal consumption choices, similar to model
frameworks used in existing literature, I formulate a tractable four-period life cycle model with
an analytical solution. This model serves as a simple illustration of the incentives in the richer
model and illustrates all results conﬁrmed by the baseline model.
The results generalize to cases in which consumers do not face credit constraints. If there
instead is some probability ℘ of receiving a zero-income shock (as in Carroll, 1997 and Gourinchas
and Parker, 2002), all results concerning the log-linearized Euler equation (3) still hold.7 This is
basically because risk averse consumers will instead face a self-imposed no-borrowing constraint
stemming from the fear of receiving zero income in all future periods with consumption of zero
as a consequence. In turn, consumption will respond substantially to negative income shocks
if either explicit or self-imposed credit constraints aﬀect consumers, increasing the variance in
consumption growth. Because higher order moments (such as something like the variance of
consumption growth, Carroll, 2001) enters the reduced form residual, ˜, log-linearized Euler
equation estimation will not be able to uncover the eﬀect of children on consumption.8
2.1 An Illustrative Model of Consumption and Children over the Life Cycle
The model consists of four periods. In the initial period, period zero, no child is present in any
household. In period one, the young stage, with probability p, a child arrives, z1 = 1, and
with probability 1− p the household remains childless, z1 = 0. In a deterministic version of the
model, children arrive with certainty in p households while a share 1 − p remains childless. In
the second period, the old stage, the child moves (if present in period one) such that z2 = 0
for all households. Households die with certainty in the end of period three and, since there is
no bequest motive, consume all available resources in this terminal period.
Utility is CRRA and the taste shifter is assumed to be given by v(zt; θ) = exp(θ#kidst)
7In absence of explicit credit constraints, the Euler equation in (1) has mean one because λt = 0, ∀t and the
exact GMM estimator produce unbiased estimates of the eﬀect of children.
8I conﬁrm this argument by Monte Carlo simulations in Section 4.
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with baseline parameters of ρ = 2 and θ = 0.5. Children are binary such that either a child
is present or not. To reduce unnecessary cluttering in equations, the gross real interest rate
and the discount factor both equal one, R = β = 1. Households receive a deterministic income
of Yt in beginning of every period. Income grow with G1 between period zero and period one
(Y1 = G1Y0) and is constant otherwise (Yt = Yt−1, t = 2, 3). The beginning-of-period resources
available for consumption is the sum of household income and end-of-period wealth carried over
from last period, Mt = At−1 + Yt.
Formally, when children arrive probabilistically, households solve the problem
max
C0,C1,C2
C1−ρ0
1− ρ + p exp(θ)
C1−ρ1
1− ρ + (1− p)
C1−ρ1
1− ρ +
C1−ρ2
1− ρ +
(M2 − C2 + Y3)1−ρ
1− ρ ,
while households, when children arrive deterministically, solve the problem for a given value of
z1 ∈ {0, 1},
max
C0,C1,C2
C1−ρ0
1− ρ + exp(θz1)
C1−ρ1
1− ρ +
C1−ρ2
1− ρ +
(M2 − C2 + Y3)1−ρ
1− ρ ,
both subject to a no-borrowing constraint, At ≥ 0, ∀t. Appendix B solves the model analytically
and reports the resulting optimal consumption functions. Note, the model in which children
arrive probabilistically has no closed form solution for period-zero consumption and is solved
numerically to complete arguments and present simulated consumption proﬁles.
Figure 1 presents consumption proﬁles for households initiated with no wealth in the initial
period, A−1 = 0, early life income growth of eight percent, G1 = 1.08 and a 50 percent share of
households with children in period one, p = 0.5. Panel (a) presents the consumption proﬁle from
a model in which children arrive probabilistically while the deterministic version is presented
in panel (b). The solid black line illustrates the consumption proﬁle of households in which
no child arrives in period one, the black dashed line represents households in which no child
arrives in a model with credit constraints, the red line illustrates the consumption proﬁle of a
household in which a child (randomly) arrives in period one in absence of constraints, and the
red dashed line represents the consumption proﬁle of the latter household in the presence of a
no-borrowing constraint. Clearly, potentially binding credit constraints aﬀect the consumption
proﬁles signiﬁcantly. Consumption growth is in general lower when a child arrives in models
with credit constraints.
The diﬀerence between the stochastic and deterministic arrival of children is the heterogene-
ity in consumption prior to the arrival of children. Consumption in period zero is lower in the
stochastic model relative to consumption of households who do not have children in the deter-
ministic model, C?0 (M0) ≤ C?0 (M0|z1 = 0)det. This illustrates that, in the stochastic model,
all households irrespectively of whether a child actually arrives in period one will accumulate
wealth to buﬀer against the potential arrival of a child as shown in Figure 1a.
In the stochastic model, consumption of young households (period one) will increase more
than income increases even if a child does not arrive. In period one it has been revealed to
childless households that they will not have children and the wealth accumulated in previous
period to buﬀer against the potential arrival of a child will be evenly distributed across remaining
periods. Contrary, in the deterministic model, childless households will increase consumption
exactly as much as income grows as shown in Figure 1b and is only aﬀected by children if they
7
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Figure 1  Consumption Proﬁles from the Simple Four-period Model, p = 0.5, ρ = 2, G1 = 1.08,
and θ = 0.5.
arrive. This, in eﬀect, results in childless households, in the deterministic model, only being
potentially credit constrained in period zero because they are unable to borrow against future
income growth.
2.2 Inconsistency and Bounds from Euler Equation Estimation
Using the simple four-period model, I show analytically that i) Euler equation estimation pro-
duce inconsistent estimates of the eﬀect of children on consumption when households face possi-
bly binding credit constraints, ii) young households can used to estimate an upper bound, and
iii) older households can be utilized to estimate a lower bound. I conﬁrm that these results hold
in a more general life cycle model by Monte Carlo simulations in Section 4 below.
Inconsistency (Young Households). Consider ﬁrst the model in which children arrives
deterministically. Then, the Euler equation linking initial consumption, C0, with consumption
of young households is
C0(z1)
−ρ − λ0(z1) = exp(θz1)C−ρ1 − λ1(z1),
where λ0(z1) is the shadow price of resources in period zero and λ1(z1) is the shadow price of
resources in period one, as increasing functions of z1.
9 As argued above, childless households,
in the deterministic version, is potentially credit constrained only in period zero since they are
not allowed to borrow against the future income growth implying that λ0(0) ≥ 0, λ1(0) = 0.
Also, the credit constraint has more bite in period one relative to period zero, λ0(1) ≤ λ1(1), if a
child arrives. Comparing log consumption growth across households with and without children
9If children increase the marginal utility of consumption (θ > 0) the credit constraint will be more binding
if a child arrives compared to if no child arrives.
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(OLS) yields a negative bias,
∆ log(C1)
det|z1=1 −∆ log(C1)det|z1=0 = ρ−1θ − ρ−1 log
[
1− (λ0(1)− λ1(1))C0(1)ρ
1− λ0(0)C0(0)ρ
]
≤ ρ−1θ,
(4)
since the nominator is greater than one while the denominator is less than one. The OLS estimate
for the baseline parameters is 0.17, signiﬁcantly less than the true value of ρ−1θ = .25. Only
if the credit constraint does not bind can the eﬀect of children on consumption be uncovered if
children arrive deterministically.
When children arrive probabilistically, the eﬀect of children on consumption cannot suc-
cessfully be uncovered even if credit constraints do not bind (λ0 = λ1 = 0) by comparing
consumption growth across household with and without children. Recall that all households are
in the initial period identical in the stochastic version and when, in period one, it is revealed
whether a child has arrived, consumption increases even if a child does not arrive.
Comparing log consumption growth in the stochastic model across households with and
without children conﬁrms this (assuming λ0 = λ1 = 0),
∆ log(C1)|z1=1 −∆ log(C1)|z1=0 = ρ−1θ − (log
(
exp(ρ−1θ) + 2
)− log(3)) ≤ ρ−1θ,
which equals ρ−1θ if and only if θ = 0 (no eﬀect of children). For the parameters used here
(ρ = 2 and θ = 0.5), the Euler equation estimate is 0.16. This downwards bias is exacerbated
if households face possibly binding credit constraints; for the parameters used here, the OLS
estimate of the eﬀect of children in the model with a credit constraint is 0.02.10
In sum, there is a downwards bias in the Euler equation estimate of the eﬀect of children on
consumption if households face credit constraints, using young households. Only if the credit
constraint does not bind can the eﬀect of children be successfully uncovered from the Euler
equation of young households. Even in this case, if children arrive probabilistically, the estimate
of the eﬀect of children will be downwards biased.
Upwards Bias of IV Using Young Households in Which Children Arrive: An Upper
Bound. Combined with the credit constraint, if income grows faster in the early part of life, a
positive bias may also distort estimation results. To see this, recall that income grows with G1
between period zero and one and is constant across all other periods. For the ease of exposition,
assume that households are credit constrained in the initial period (prior to children) and is
also credit constrained in period one only if a child arrives. This scenario is relevant since it is
a parsimonious description of young households: they are (at least) initially credit constrained
and have a steep income path. Under these assumptions, households who have children will
increase consumption with as much as income grows.
Using the cohort-average number of children as instrument, Z = ∆z1 = p, will produce
an upwards bias for even moderate income growth. Imagine that there is no eﬀect of children
(θ = 0) while maintaining the previous assumptions that households are credit constrained in
10As discussed in Appendix B, there is no closed form solution to the initial period consumption if children
arrive probabilistically. The optimal consumption is, therefor, found numerically in this case.
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the initial period. The IV estimate of the eﬀect of children on consumption is then
E[∆ logC ′1Z]
E[Z ′Z]
=
1
p
(p∆ log(C1)|z1=1 + (1− p)∆ log(C1)|z1=0),
=
1
p
(p∆ log(C1) + (1− p)∆ log(C1)),
= log(G1)/p ≥ ρ−1θ = 0, (5)
such that the Euler equation IV estimation is upwards biased if households are initially con-
strained and income grows.
If the eﬀect of children is large enough, households want to accumulate suﬃcient wealth to
escape the credit constraint and ensure a situation in which they can increase consumption as
desired, when children arrive. Hence, for large values of θ, households will in eﬀect act as if there
where no credit constraints. In such a situation, if children arrive probabilistically, using the
cohort-average number of children will still produce a positive bias in the estimate of the eﬀect of
children, but the bias is very small.11 To see this, imagine that children arrive probabilistically
and there is no credit constraints. ∆z1 = p is used as instrument such that after very tedious
algebra the IV estimator is given by (see Appendix B.3 for the derivation)
E[∆ logC ′1Z]
E[Z ′Z]
=
1
p
(p∆ log(C1)|z1=1 + (1− p)∆ log(C1)|z1=0),
= ρ−1θ + ω ≥ ρ−1θ, (6)
where
ω ≡ p−1 [ρ−1 log (p (exp(ρ−1θ) + 2)ρ + (1− p)3ρ)− (p log (exp(ρ−1θ) + 2)+ (1− p) log (3))] .
The bias, ω, is the diﬀerence between the log-expected value, logE, and the expected-log
value, E log.12 Since the logarithm is a concave function the former is always greater than the
latter (logE > E log) such that the bias is positive. Note, however, that this bias is rather small
and vanishes asymptotically, such that limρ→∞ ω = 0 and limp→1 ω = 0 . For the parameters
used here, ρ = 2, θ = .5, and p = .5, the bias is only ω ≈ 0.004. This very small bias is also
found in Monte Carlo simulations from the richer baseline model below.
This upwards bias motivates the use of young households to estimate an upper bound on the
eﬀect of children using the cohort-average number of children as instrument. In general, using
the cohort-average number of children as instrument produce an upwards bias. If the eﬀect of
children is large enough, households will accumulate suﬃcient wealth prior to the arrival of
children to escape the constraint, reducing the bias signiﬁcantly. In this case, the IV estimate
is very close to the true eﬀect of children.13
11If children arrive deterministically, the eﬀect of children can be uncovered using the change in number of
children, ∆z1, as shown in (4)
12Deﬁning ω1 ≡ (exp(ρ−1θ) + 2)ρ and ω2 ≡ 3ρ, the error is ω = p−1ρ−1(log(pω1 + (1− p)ω2)− (p logω1 + (1−
p) logω2)).
13The use of an instrument, when credit constraints are not binding, is only required if children arrive proba-
bilistically. If children are perfectly foreseen, as in the deterministic model, the change in the number of children
can identify the eﬀect of children on consumption, as shown in equation (4).
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Downwards Bias Using Older Households inWhich Children Leave: A Lower Bound.
I now analyze the identiﬁcation of θ using only older households from which children move with
certainty in period two. The Euler equation linking period one and period two consumption is
given by
C−ρ1 exp(θz1)− λ1(z1) = C−ρ2 − λ2(z1),
such that comparing log consumption growth (negative since children move) across households
with and without children yields a negative bias,
−(∆ log(C2)|z1=1−∆ log(C2)|z1=0) = ρ−1θ+ρ−1 log
[
1− (λ1(1)− λ2(1))C(1)ρ1 exp(−θ)
1− (λ1(0)− λ2(0))C(0)ρ1
]
≤ ρ−1θ.
This is because if the childless household was credit constrained in period one (λ1(0) > 0),
they will also be constrained in period two implying that the household with children also will be
credit constrained in both periods (since θ > 0). In turn, consumption growth across households
with and without children are identical and the OLS estimate of the eﬀect of children will be
zero. Unless there is no eﬀect of children (θ = 0), this is less than the true eﬀect. On the other
hand, if childless households are not constrained in period one, they will also not be constrained
in period two (λ1(0) = λ2(0) = 0) producing a negative bias since λ1(1) ≥ λ2(1) ⇒ log[·] ≤ 0,
when θ ≥ 0.
In conclusion, there is a negative bias from Euler equation estimation of the eﬀect of children
on consumption, using older households. For the parameters used here (ρ = 2 and θ = 0.5),
the Euler equation estimate is 0.13 and 0.11 for the deterministic and stochastic models, respec-
tively.14 Only if the credit constraint is not binding in either period, can the eﬀect of children
be uncovered from the Euler equation of older households.
This downwards bias can be utilized to estimate a lower bound of the eﬀect of children on
consumption. If the eﬀect of children is relatively small, the credit constraint is likely to be less
binding for older households and the eﬀect of children can be identiﬁed from older households.
Otherwise, if the eﬀect of children is large, the OLS estimate using older households will be less
than the actual eﬀect of children.
Table 1 summarizes the Euler equation estimation results from the four-period model. Under
estimation is indicated with an underline while an overline highlight over estimation. It is clear
that OLS using older households produce a lower bound and if credit constraints are absent
uncover the underlying eﬀect of children on consumption. Independent of whether children arrive
deterministically or probabilistically, IV estimation using only younger households produce an
upper bound. If children arrive deterministically the true eﬀect of children is uncovered using
the change in the cohort-average number of children.
14The bias is larger for stochastic model since households smooth expected utility and when a child subsequently
arrives the level of wealth accumulated is less than what is accumulated in the deterministic model. Hence, the
constraint will be more severe in the stochastic model increasing λ1.
11
Table 1  Euler Equation Estimation Results, Four-
Period Model, ρ−1θ = 0.25.
Young Older
Arrival of children OLS IV OLS IV
Unconstrained
Probabilistically 0.160 0.254 0.250 0.250
Deterministically 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250
Constrained
Probabilistically 0.023 0.276 0.034 0.034
Deterministically 0.173 0.327 0.079 0.079
Notes: Log-linearized Euler equation results of ρ̂−1θ from
four-period model. Parameters are β = 1, = 1, ρ = 2,
θ = 0.5, p = 0.5, and G1 = 1.08. An overline marks over
estimation (compared to ρ−1θ = 0.25) and an underline
marks under estimation.
3 The Baseline Model
The framework used throughout the rest of this study is a version of the buﬀer-stock model
which has been used extensively for diﬀerent purposes in the consumption literature. The model
captures the main consumption and savings incentives of households over the life cycle prior to
retirement. Speciﬁcally, the model is very similar to the one used in Attanasio, Banks, Meghir
and Weber (1999); Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Cagetti (2003). Similar models are used
in many diﬀerent areas of research in which household demographics often are ignored while
other features are augmented.15
Households work until an exogenously given retirement age, Tr, and die with certainty at
age T where they consume all available resources. In all preceding periods, households solve the
optimization problem
max
Ct
Et
[
Tr−1∑
τ=t
βτ−tv(zt; θ)u(Cτ ) + γ
T∑
s=Tr
βs−tv(zt; θ)u(Cτ )
]
, (7)
where utility is CRRA and v(zt; θ) is a taste shifter, monotonically increasing in zt, which
contains variables describing the number and age of children and θ is their loadings.
Following Gourinchas and Parker (2002), survival and income uncertainty are omitted post
retirement and the parameter γ (referred to as the retirement motive) in equation (7) is a
parsimonious way of adjusting for these elements.16 Gourinchas and Parker (2002) ignore the
post-retirement consumption decisions and adjust the perfect foresight approximation by a pa-
rameter similar to γ through a retirement value function. Although I focus on consumption
behavior prior to retirement, the potential presence of children at retirement forces the model
15Some examples (with a sample of references) are estimation of the rate of time preference (Lawrance, 1991;
Dynan, 2000; Alan and Browning, 2010) housing decisions (Yang, 2009; Marekwica, Schaefer and Sebastian,
2013), consumption inequality and partial insurance (Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron, 2004; Blundell, Pistaferri
and Preston, 2008; Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante, forthcoming), and retirement choices (Blau, 2008; van
der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008).
16Survival is also certain prior to retirement.
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to be speciﬁc about post retirement behavior as well. Speciﬁcally, ignoring the presence of chil-
dren after retirement (as done in Gourinchas and Parker, 2002) would lead the model to under
estimate optimal consumption in periods prior to retirement.17 Since the focus of this study is
on estimation of θ, it is essential that aspects related to children are properly handled.
Households solve (7) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint,
Mt+1 = R(Mt − Ct) + Yt+1,
where R is the gross real interest rate, Mt is resources available for consumption in beginning
of period t and Yt is beginning-of-period income. While working, income is assumed to follow
the stochastic process
Yt = Ptεt, ∀t < Tr,
Pt = GtPt−1ηt, ∀t < Tr,
where Pt denotes permanent income, Gt is real gross income growth, ηt ∼ logN (−σ2η/2, σ2η)
is a mean one permanent income shock, and εt is a mean one transitory income shock taking
the value µ with probability ℘ and otherwise distributed (1 − ℘)εt ∼ logN (−σ2ε/2 − µ℘, σ2ε).
When retired, the income process is a deterministic fraction κ ≤ 1 of permanent income and
permanent income grows with a constant rate of Gret once retired,
Yt = κPt, ∀t ≥ Tr,
Pt = GretPt−1, ∀t ≥ Tr.
In each period, households face an intratemporal budget,
Mt = At + Ct,
At ≥ −κPt ∀t, κ ≥ 0,
such that end-of-period wealth, At, and consumption must equal the available resources in
the beginning of the period and net wealth must be greater than a fraction −κ of permanent
income in all time periods. When retired, households are not allowed to be net borrowers,
At ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ Tr, following Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
3.1 Household Composition
The evolution of children, zt, is normally ignored since household compositional eﬀects typically
are ignored or collapsed into a deterministic correction of the discount factor, identical for all
households (Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber, 1999; Gourinchas and Parker, 2002; Cagetti,
2003; Bick and Choi, 2013). Such studies calculate an average age proﬁle for the taste shifter
(based on Euler equation estimation results) which all households irrespectively of the speciﬁc
17This is because to much is saved in the last working period if the decrease in marginal value of consumption
in the future, when a child moves, is ignored. Households who know that, while they are retired, a child will
move, will incorporate the associated drop in household consumption already before retiring since less wealth is
required to maintain a given level of consumption while retired.
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composition within a given household is assigned. This strategy would, however, not allow
identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of children on household consumption because all households are
aﬀected identically. Since θ is of primary interest in this study, I will be precise about the
underlying process regarding the arrival and leaving of children.
As most of the existing literature, I follow Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber (1999) and
let children aﬀect the marginal value of consumption through a multiplicative v(zt; θ). Alterna-
tively, the household composition could be included as a scaling of resources and consumption
(equivalence scaling), as done in, e.g., Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2007). See Bick and
Choi (2013) for an analysis of diﬀerent approaches to and implied behavior from inclusion of
household demographics in life cycle models. Alternative parametrizations would simply require
reformulating the estimable equations accordingly and, thus, this particular parametrization is
not generating any of the results.
Individuals do not die, divorce or remarry such that households consist of the same husband
and wife at all times. Households can have at most three children and no infants arrive after
the wife turns 43 years old. For notational simplicity, the age of each child is contained in zt,
zt = (age of child 1t, age of child 2t, age of child 3t) ∈ {NC, [0, 20]}3,
where NC refers to No Child and the oldest child is denoted child one, the second oldest
child as child two and the third oldest child as child three.
When a child is aged 21 the child does not inﬂuence household consumption in subsequent
periods regardless of the value of θ. The arrival of an infant is stochastic with a known probability
distribution depending on the age of the wife and number of children already present in the
household. Households chose optimal consumption based on their (rational) expectations about
arrival of children in future periods. Children could arrive deterministically while allowing for
heterogeneity across households. If, e.g., all households know with perfect foresight how many
children they will have and when these children arrive, a deterministic version of the model used
throughout can be formulated.18
In the baseline stochastic case, not only households who have children are aﬀected by the
parameter θ. Households dynamically optimize their consumption behavior while incorporating
expectations about the future such that all younger households within the same age group
who have no children will want to reduce their consumption today in anticipation of increased
consumption when children might arrive in the future. In the deterministic case, the savings
rate will diﬀer across households within age groups due to diﬀerences in when and how many
children arrive over the life cycle. It is not obvious which is the most appropriate assumption
(probabilistic or deterministic arrival on children) and the stochastic version has been chosen
as baseline since that model does not require knowledge on completed fertility of individual
households, when estimating model parameters. Results do diﬀer signiﬁcantly if children arrive
deterministically rather than probabilistically, as indicated in the four-period model above and
supported by Monte Carlo results below.
18Alternatively, and in between these two extremes, the choice of children could be endogenous in the model.
For computational tractability I do not pursue that approach here but the very similar empirical results in Section
6.4 for both Danish and US consumers suggest that the arrival process of children does not drive the results.
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4 Euler Equation Estimation: Inconsistency and Bounds
In this section, I conﬁrm the results from the four-period model in Section 2 using the baseline
life cycle model described in Section 3, often used in the literature: i) Euler equation estimation
suﬀers from an omitted variable bias when households face potentially binding credit constraints,
ii) When income growth and credit constraints interact, Euler equation estimation using only
young households produce an upper bound of the eﬀect of children, and iii) Using only older
households produce a lower bound of the eﬀect of children.
4.1 Inconsistency of Euler Equation Estimation: A Monte Carlo Study
Unlike the simple four-period model, the baseline model does not have an analytical solution.
To simulate synthetic data, I solve the life cycle model using the Endogenous Grid Method
(EGM) proposed by Carroll (2006) with standard parameters presented in Table 2. The
technical details of the solution method are provided in Appendix C. The solution is then used
to generate data for a given age and level of resources for 50, 000 households from age 22 to
59. All households are initiated at age 22 with zero wealth, A21 = 0, permanent income of one
(normalization), P22 = 1, and no previous children, z21 = (NC,NC,NC).
Table 2  Parameter Values Used to Simulate Data.
Gt R σ
2
ε σ
2
η κ ℘ µ β ρ γ κ Gret θ
Fig. A.1 1.03 .005 .005 0 0 0 .95 2 1.1 .8 1.0 {0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5}
In each period, a transitory and permanent income shock is randomly drawn from their
respective distributions, described in Section 3, and multiplied permanent income to generate
household income, Yt. Last periods optimal end-of-period wealth is used together with household
income to calculate beginning-of-period available resources, Mt = RAt−1 + Yt. Figure A.1
presents the income growth rates. The income proﬁle is concave and constant from age 40 to
mimic empirical income proﬁles observed in most data.
To simulate the number and age of children in a household in a given period, the infant arrival
probability is calculated using the PSID. The estimated arrival probabilities, as a function of
age and number of children already present, are presented in the Figure A.2a in Appendix A.
At each age, a uniform random variable is drawn and if the uniform draw is less than the arrival
probability, a child arrives. When a child is 21 it moves and does not aﬀect household behavior.
The resulting proﬁle of average number of children is presented in Figure A.2b and resembles
the empirical proﬁle from the PSID.19
Figure 2 presents simulated age proﬁles for income, consumption and wealth. To show how
increasing the eﬀect of children aﬀects consumption and wealth accumulation over the life cycle,
age proﬁles are shown for three diﬀerent values of θ. All consumption proﬁles (even if children
does not aﬀect consumption) exhibit a hump when households are in the mid 40s, as typically
observed in real data. If children aﬀect consumption, the hump is exacerbated producing a
19The sharp kink in the average number of children after age 42 stems from the fact that all households are
initiated with no children at age 21 such that at age 43 the children arrived at age 22 moves.
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steeper consumption proﬁle for young households and a subsequent larger decrease in consump-
tion after the mid 40s. Income uncertainty, income growth and credit constraints produce an
increasing consumption proﬁle early in life, even if children does not aﬀect consumption. This is
a key feature of the model. If income is constant and certain and inﬁnite borrowing is allowed,
the consumption proﬁle would be ﬂat for childless households and only children can produce the
hump in consumption.
The retirement motive, eﬀectively reducing the value of consumption later in the working life,
produces a downward sloping consumption proﬁle after the mid 40s. Income is, post retirement,
a deterministic fraction of permanent income and no borrowing is allowed once households are
retired. This produce a strong incentive (depending on the size of γ) to accumulate wealth
for retirement. Because households consume most of their income early in life (when income
growth is high) the level of wealth accumulated around age 45 is not enough to smooth utility
across retirement. Therefore, households reduce consumption later in life (when income grows
less). In absence of this retirement motive, the consumption proﬁle later in life would be ﬂat. In
combination with income growth and credit constraints, the consumption proﬁle is hump shaped
even if children does not aﬀect consumption.
(a) Simulated Income and Consumption
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(b) Simulated Wealth
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Figure 2  Simulated Income, Consumption and Wealth Age Proﬁles. 50, 000 households.
Interestingly, the consumption proﬁles across θ values are very similar for young households.
This stems from income uncertainty and credit constraints preventing households from increasing
consumption when children arrive despite they would want to, had the credit constraint not
been present. Hence, the eﬀect of children would be under estimated using young households,
as shown earlier. If the eﬀect of children is rather large, young households increase wealth
accumulation in anticipation of children arriving in the future. When children subsequently
arrive, wealth is signiﬁcantly decumulated such that the credit constraint is binding for many
households when children eventually move. The relative drop in consumption from a constrained
level to an unconstrained level in general will be less than the relative change if households had
never been constrained. Hence, the eﬀect of children would be underestimated when only using
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older households. This is exactly the point made using the simple four-period model.
When the eﬀect of children is small (θ ≤ 0.1 here), the Euler residual will be positively
correlated with the number of children. This is because consumption growth, even when children
does not aﬀect consumption, tend to be high for young households due to the credit constraint
while the number of children also grows in this part of the life cycle. This positive correlation
induce a positive bias in the estimation of the eﬀect of children. Whether the negative or positive
bias dominates is an empirical question.
In sum, the presence of credit constraints would tend to over estimate the eﬀect of children on
household consumption when the eﬀect of children is small and under estimate the eﬀect when
it is large. I conﬁrm this argument by applying the exact GMM estimator and the log-linearized
Euler equation method to 1,000 independent simulated data sets for diﬀerent values of θ0. Table
3 reports full-sample mean estimation results (and standard deviation across MC runs) using as
instrument the actual change in number of children ∆zt−s for lags s = 0, 1, 2 and the change in
the cohort-average number of children, ∆zt. To evaluate the performance for diﬀerent lengths
in the time dimension, 5 and 20 periods are used for estimation. All households are simulated
from 22 through 59 and an age-window for each household is chosen randomly to start between
age 25 and 54 (between 25 and 39 when T = 20 periods are used). The results are based on
all households, as is standard in the literature, to show how the estimates would diﬀer from the
correct eﬀect of children on consumption.
None of the estimation methods and instruments are able to uncover the true value of θ.
For low levels of θ, there is a positive bias while for higher levels the bias is negative conﬁrming
the intuitive reasoning from the simple four-period model. The estimates are almost unaﬀected
by the true value of θ and the bias persists as sample size increases. The large dispersion of
parameters using lagged household-level instruments, ∆zt−1 and ∆zt−2 indicate that the number
of children inside a household is so persistent that these instruments carry little information.
Using the growth in cohort-average number of children produce similar point estimates but with
greater precision.
To better understand and interpret the Monte Carlo results, Figure 3 plots the Euler residuals
for diﬀerent values of θ. The reduced form Euler residual, ˜, is shown in panel b. When the
eﬀect of children is low, the Euler residual is positively correlated with the growth in number
of children, since ˜ decrease over the life cycle as the growth in number of children also tend to.
This positive correlation produce a signiﬁcant over estimation across all methods and instruments
when θ = 0.0.
When the eﬀect of children are higher (θ > .1 here) estimates are signiﬁcantly lower than
the true parameter for all sample sizes, estimation approaches and instruments. This downward
bias is a result of the Euler residuals being negatively correlated with the number of children as
shown in Figure 3 stemming from the fact that when the marginal value of consumption increase
(decrease) signiﬁcantly when children are present (move) the likelihood of the credit constraint
binding in the future drops signiﬁcantly when children move. Hence, the term λt − RβE[λt+1]
increases producing a negative correlation between the growth in number of children and the
error term.
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Table 3  Monte Carlo Results.
θ = 0.0 θ = 0.1 θ = 0.3 θ = 0.5
Instrument LogLin GMM LogLin GMM LogLin GMM LogLin GMM
N = 1000, T = 5
∆zt 0.020 0.012 0.073 0.066 0.122 0.123 0.160 0.162
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
∆zt−1 0.218 0.124 0.199 0.122 0.107 0.073 0.121 0.090
(0.115) (0.103) (0.114) (0.099) (0.116) (0.099) (0.114) (0.100)
∆zt−2 0.245 0.146 0.254 0.167 0.218 0.161 0.233 0.184
(0.189) (0.163) (0.185) (0.157) (0.178) (0.149) (0.173) (0.149)
∆zt 0.133 0.073 0.164 0.111 0.185 0.150 0.238 0.200
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024)
N = 1000, T = 20
∆zt 0.015 0.006 0.073 0.065 0.119 0.118 0.144 0.145
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
∆zt−1 0.161 0.049 0.137 0.048 0.026 0.001 0.016 0.004
(0.044) (0.031) (0.046) (0.032) (0.050) (0.034) (0.051) (0.034)
∆zt−2 0.177 0.052 0.194 0.077 0.151 0.075 0.143 0.084
(0.057) (0.037) (0.057) (0.036) (0.059) (0.037) (0.059) (0.038)
∆zt 0.113 0.035 0.146 0.072 0.161 0.103 0.198 0.138
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
N = 50000, T = 5
∆zt 0.021 0.012 0.073 0.067 0.122 0.123 0.160 0.162
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
∆zt−1 0.210 0.120 0.193 0.119 0.108 0.073 0.123 0.090
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
∆zt−2 0.230 0.136 0.243 0.158 0.215 0.159 0.231 0.182
(0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019)
∆zt 0.162 0.089 0.187 0.123 0.202 0.157 0.258 0.211
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
N = 50000, T = 20
∆zt 0.015 0.006 0.073 0.065 0.119 0.118 0.144 0.145
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆zt−1 0.158 0.047 0.135 0.047 0.025 0.000 0.016 0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
∆zt−2 0.178 0.054 0.196 0.079 0.154 0.078 0.147 0.087
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
∆zt 0.125 0.038 0.155 0.073 0.166 0.102 0.204 0.137
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) are reported. Standard deviations are across monte carlo
estimations. All results are based on 1,000 independent estimations on simulated data from the model described
in Section 3 with the parameters presented in Table 2. The reported results for "LogLin" are of the "raw"
estimate times ρ to facilitate a structural interpretation of the estimates. For each run, data are simulated for all
N households from age 22 through 59 and a random adjacent period of length T is drawn from this simulation.
All individuals are initiated at age 22 with zero wealth, A21 = 0, permanent income of one, P22 = 1, and no
children. Children are assigned randomly following the estimated arrival probabilities estimated from the PSID,
reported in Figure A.2.
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(a) Structural Euler Residuals, t
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(b) Log-Linear Euler Residuals, ˜t
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Figure 3  Simulated Euler Residuals.
This illustrates the importance of household's expectations about the severity of the credit
constraint, E[λt+1]. As discussed earlier, existing studies often handle potentially binding credit
constraints by discarding observations where λt = 0, i.e., end-of-period wealth is positive. This
procedure ignores, however, the expectations about λt+1, something that can have devastating
important implications for the consumption behavior in period t, as illustrated in Figure 3.
As argued in Section 2, the bias of the log-linearized Euler equation persists while GMM
estimation is unbiased if there is no credit constraint but instead households face some small
probability, ℘ > 0, of becoming unemployed and receiving zero income, µ = 0. To illustrate this,
Figure A.3 in Appendix A reports the average Euler residuals from a model in which ℘ = 0.003
and µ = 0, following Gourinchas and Parker (2002). As expected, the structural Euler residual,
, in this case vary randomly around a mean of 1 while the age proﬁle of the reduced form
log-linearized Euler residual is very similar to the one presented in Figure 3b from a model with
an explicit credit constraint. This result extends the critique in Carroll (2001) on the inability
of Euler equation estimation to uncover the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (ρ−1) to the
eﬀect of children on consumption, θ.
4.2 Estimating Bounds of the Eﬀect of Children Using the Euler Equation
4.2.1 Using older households and ∆zt to estimate a lower bound
As argued above and using the four-period model, older households will often not be credit
constrained when children move but might be while they are present. In that case, cov(∆zt, ˜t) ≤
0 producing a negative bias in the estimate of θ when using ∆zt as instrument. When the eﬀect
of children is suﬃciently low, the likelihood that older households will not be credit constrained
while children are present increases. This is because the consumption motive in the presence
of children (in previous periods) has been less strong compared to the retirement motive and
more wealth has been accumulated. This in turn results in λt = E[λt+1] = 0 such that no bias
is present and the true eﬀect of children can be estimated.
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Figure 4  Estimation on Sub-samples based on Age of Wife, from age 59 through 25.
To conﬁrm this intuitive reasoning, Figure 4 presents results from GMM and log-linearized
Euler equation estimation using 50,000 simulated households. Data are simulated as described
above. The ﬁgure reports estimation results using diﬀerent instruments to estimate θ ∈ {0.0, 0.1, 0.5}
on sub-samples. The sup-samples are constructed such that increasingly younger households are
included from age 59 through 25. For example, when the age of the youngest household included
is 35, the estimation sample consists only of 35-59 year old households.
When the eﬀect of children is suﬃciently large, the Euler equation estimates using only older
households are lower than the true value while for low values of θ, using only older households
can uncover the true value of θ, conﬁrming the argument above. Hence, using the actual change
in number of children, ∆zt, as instrument and restricting the estimation sample to only include
older households produce a lower bound of θ. For completeness, the same exercise has been
performed in a deterministic version of the model in which households have perfect foresight
regarding arrival of children. The results are identical, as shown in Figure A.5 in Appendix A.
4.2.2 Using young households and ∆zt as instrument to estimate upper bound
If the true value of θ is too low to induce consumers to accumulate wealth early in life,
the estimation on young households using ∆zt as instrument will produce estimates above the
true parameter. If the true value of θ is large enough such that young households engage in
accumulation of wealth before children arrive, an estimate very close to the true parameter can
be uncovered using only young households and ∆zt as instrument producing an upper bound of
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the eﬀect of children. This result was shown using the four-period model above.
Imagine a situation in which there is no eﬀect of children on consumption (θ = 0). When
young, consumption will tend to grow (due to income growth and credit constraints) while the
cohort-average number of children (zt) increases producing a positive bias in the estimation of θ
using ∆zt as instrument. Imagine instead that children have a large eﬀect on household consump-
tion such that households will accumulate suﬃcient wealth to be able to increase consumption
when children arrive. In this case, the credit constraint will have less bite (λt = E[λt+1] = 0) and
the eﬀect of children can (almost) be uncovered. As discussed in relation to equation (6) when
analyzing the four-period model, if children arrive probabilistically using ∆zt as instrument pro-
duces a very small positive bias when the eﬀect of children is large if credit constraints does not
aﬀect consumers. In sum, using only young households and ∆zt as instrument producing an
upper bound of the eﬀect of children.
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Figure 5  Estimation on Sub-samples based on Age of Wife, from age 25 through 59.
To conﬁrm this intuitive reasoning, Figure 5 presents results from GMM and log-linearized
estimation using 50,000 simulated households. The ﬁgure reports estimation results using diﬀer-
ent instruments to estimate θ ∈ {0.0, 0.1, 0.5} on sub-samples. The sup-samples are constructed
such that increasingly older households are included from age 25 through 59. For example, when
the age of the oldest household included is 35, the estimation sample consists only of 25-35 year
old households.
Clearly, using young households when θ is low produce over estimation. Interestingly, the
estimate is unaﬀected by the true value of θ, illustrating identiﬁcation issues when households
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are potentially credit constrained. Using the simple four-period model, I showed in equation
(5) that if households are credit constrained prior to the arrival of children and children have
no eﬀect on consumption, the proposed instrument produce an estimate of the eﬀect of children
proportional to log income growth. Hence, if the eﬀect of children is small, the bias is large
relative to the eﬀect of children, and the IV estimate is almost independent of the true eﬀect of
children on consumption.
When the eﬀect of children is large (θ = .5 here) households accumulate a substantial amount
of wealth early in life to be able to increase consumption when children arrive and the log-linear
Euler equation produce something close to the correct parameter estimate, as predicted. The
GMM estimator still over estimate the eﬀect of children due to the mean Euler residual in (1)
being less than one forcing the estimate of θ upwards in compensation. Since the bias is positive,
GMM estimation can still be used as upper bound. Alternatively, using a additional moments
will allow researchers to estimate the mean Euler residual and the true θ could be uncovered.
Often, the mean is used to estimate the discount factor, β, (ﬁxed at the true value here) and
this estimate might just pick up this diﬀerence. In any case, since the bias is positive, and I am
suggesting using the estimate as an upper bound, this has not been investigated further.
For completeness, the same exercise has been performed in a deterministic version of the
model in which households have perfect foresight regarding arrival of children. Using ∆zt as
instrument still produce an upper bound, as shown in Figure A.6 in Appendix A. As also
shown in the four-period model, since children only aﬀect households in which they arrive in the
deterministic model, using the actual change in number of children, ∆zt, can identify the eﬀect
of children when the eﬀect is suﬃciently large.
4.2.3 Using These Bounds in Practice
Choosing the age at which to split the sample into young and older households is not obvious.
One choice could be to chose the age at which the average number of children starts to decline
since the behavior of households should diﬀer when children arrives from when they move since
credit constraints aﬀect younger households most. Alternatively, the age at which average net
wealth is signiﬁcantly larger than average income could be chosen since around this point (on
average) households are less aﬀected by credit constraints. Optimally, if the data availability
allows, recursive estimation results successively including younger and older households as done
in Figure 4 and 5, respectively, would supply information about the eﬀects of children.
The results rests on the existence of credit constraints. However, as previously argued, if
instead of credit constraints, households face a small but positive probability of receiving some
low income shock, all results concerning the log-linearized Euler equation still hold including
the bounds, as shown in Figure A.4 in Appendix A. This result supports that, even if credit
constraints are not present, the log-linearized Euler equation produce inconsistent estimates
(due to omitted higher order terms in the residual, see Carroll, 2001) and can be utilized to
estimate bounds on the eﬀect of children on consumption.
One crucial assumption when calculating the bounds above is that of the researcher having
knowledge on other structural parameters. Using the exact GMM estimation approach, both
the discount factor, β, and the relative risk aversion, ρ, should be estimated simultaneously or
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qualiﬁed guesses on these parameters should be used. Log-linearized Euler equation estimation
requires information only on the risk aversion parameter. Therefore, the bounds vary with
the choice of other structural parameters. This is a drawback but varying these parameters in
accepted ranges would then produce a set of bounds with more or less information on the size
of the eﬀect of children.
Another assumption that has been invoked throughout is homoscedasticity of the Euler
residuals. If, for example, diﬀerent groups have diﬀerent income variance or income growth
rates the structural Euler residuals will be heteroscedastic. If ignored, this will invalidate the
log-linearized Euler estimation approach since higher order moments will be present in the mean
of the log-transformed Euler residual, ˜. Browning, Ejrnæs and Alvarez (2010) show evidence
that income processes are characterized by signiﬁcant heterogeneity indicating failure of the
homoscedasticity assumption.
Measurement error in observed consumption measures have been ignored throughout. Run-
kle (1991) ﬁnds evidence that changes in log food consumption in the PSID is more than 70
percent measurement error. GMM estimators are notoriously vulnerable to measurement error
and Alan, Attanasio and Browning (2009) propose two GMM estimators in which log-normal
multiplicative measurement error in consumption is allowed for. Both estimators, however,
rely on the availability of panel data and must assume log normal measurement error. Alan
and Browning (2010) supply a simulation method (SRE) in which the Euler residual is fully
parametrized along with the measurement error in consumption. Their method does not rely
on panel data but cannot handle credit constraints and requires researchers to fully parametrize
the the measurement error (and other unknown processes).20
It is important to stress that throughout this paper, as in the rest of the literature, income
is assumed independent of household composition. If income depend on household composition,
the results will change. Although allowing income to vary with household composition is an
interesting avenue for future research, I have not pursued that here.
An alternative route to estimating bounds is to utilize the moment inequality rather than
the equality in the GMM estimator (2). Assuming that an instrument is potentially positively
correlated with the Euler residual, E[( − 1)′Z] ≥ 0 could be used as a moment inequality to
estimate bounds (Moon and Schorfheide, 2009). This approach is very interesting for future
research but I do not pursue that strategy here.21
I supply an alternative estimation strategy to estimate all structural parameters of the
underlying model simultaneously. The estimation strategy does not rely on the availability of
panel data and can accommodate a variety of measurement error speciﬁcations. The framework
require information on the age of children, the level of resources inside the household (wealth
and income) and consumption measures.
20The measurement error parametrization proposed in Alan and Browning (2010) is extremely numerically
unstable since three exponential functions are nested to insure positivity of several parameters.
21I am grateful to Dennis Kristensen for pointing this out to me.
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5 Structural Estimation Strategy
In this section, I formulate a novel structural M-estimator to uncover parameters of intertemporal
consumption choice models, analyzed throughout this study. I propose a continuous version
of the Nested Fixed Point (NFXP) estimation approach, suggested by Rust (1987), that is
consistent and asymptotically normally distributed under fairly standard regularity conditions.
Speciﬁcally, for a given set of K structural parameters, Θ, the model is solved recursively for
all combinations of household composition. This yields optimal consumption as a function of
resources, permanent income and household composition, {C?t (Mt, Pt, zt|Θ)}T1 .22 In principle,
Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), proposed by Su and Judd
(2012) could be used to estimate parameters. However, as discussed in Jørgensen (2013), because
the model in the present study is a ﬁnite horizon (life cycle) model with a large state space,
MPEC most likely would be much slower than the NFXP.
This approach requires numerically solving for optimal policy rules from a full speciﬁed
structural model. This is a drawback in the sense that all elements of the economic environment
should be explicitly modeled. For example, the process of children arriving and moving over
the life cycle is fully speciﬁed in the present model forcing a concrete choice of stochastic versus
deterministic or endogenous arrival of children. I discussed this choice in Section 3. It can
also be seen as an advantage because researchers can specify the environment exactly according
to underlying assumptions. For example, including a credit constraint is rather simple in this
estimation approach, while none of the estimators discussed so far can handle credit constraints.
GMM and Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation are contained in the general framework
and structural parameters can be estimated on cross section data. This makes the estimation
approach extremely ﬂexible and useful because structural parameters can be estimated using
repeated cross sections which most surveys are.23 The approach require, however, information
on i) the age of children, ii) household income, iii) household wealth, and iv) consumption
measures. These requirements may seem strong but increasingly many countries register these
information on the individual level.
Let O = (M,P,C, z)data ∈ O denote observed information where O ⊂ Rdim(O) and Oit refers
to household i in period t and R are the real numbers. Deﬁne a function of the observed data
and model solution, for a given set of parameters, as
ξit(Θ) ≡ ξ(Oit, C?t |Θ),
in which observed data is used to infer the model predictions for each household-time observation.
Speciﬁcally, for a given observation, Oit, the associated prediction from the structural model
can be found by interpolating the relevant policy function, referred to as Cˇ?(Oit|Θ) in examples
below. Let
gi(Θ, φ) ≡ g(ξi(Θ), φ),
denote a real-valued function taking as argument stacked time observations, ξi(Θ), in which φ
22Consult Appendix B for details on the solution method applied to solve the model described in Section 3.
23The CEX is an extensively used repeated cross section survey on consumption behavior. Information on age
of children are, to my knowledge, not available for the CEX households.
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contain Kφ additional parameters. All parameters are in a compact space, (Θ, φ) ∈ C ⊂ RK+Kφ ,
and g : O× C→ R is, for all Oit ∈ O, continuous in (Θ, φ).24
The proposed estimator solves the problem
min
(Θ,φ)∈C
N−1
N∑
i=1
gi(Θ, φ), (8)
and, assuming an unique solution exists, is consistent by the uniform weak law of large numbers.
Assume that i) the true parameters, (Θ0, φ0), are in the interior of C, ii) the gradient, s(Θ, φ),
and hessian, H(Θ, φ), of g exists in this interior point, iii) the gradient has mean zero and
ﬁnite second order moment, iv) the mean hessian is positive deﬁnite, and v) each element of
the hessian is bounded. Then, the estimator is asymptotically normally distributed around
the true parameter with asymptotic variance of A−1BA−1/N , where A ≡ E[H(Θ, φ)] and
B ≡ E[s(Θ, φ)′s(Θ, φ)] (Wooldridge, 2002).
Optimal behavior is in general found numerically and the objective function in (8) is an
approximation to the exact objective function. Fernández-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramírez and Santos
(2006) show, in a likelihood framework, that as long as the numerical approximation converges
to the unique exact solution, the approximated likelihood function converges uniformly to the
exact likelihood function. This provides the strong result that parameters estimated by (8)
are consistent and asymptotically normally distributed even when the solution, C?, is found
numerically.25
To illustrate the ﬂexibility of the estimator, I present concrete examples in which assumptions
often invoked in the literature are implemented in the framework above. Example 1 illustrates
how the estimator can estimate structural parameters if consumption is contaminated with
additive normally distributed measurement error. Readers who feel uncomfortable with the
normality assumption in Example 1 could think of the estimation problem as one of non-linear
least squares. Alternative distributional assumptions could be implemented or the absolute
diﬀerence could be minimized (gi(Θ) =
∑Ti
t |ξit(Θ)|), yielding an estimator more robust to
outliers.
Example 1 (Additive Normal Measurement Error). If consumption data is contaminated with
iid additive N (0, σ2ξ ) measurement error, then letting
ξit(Θ) = C
data
it − Cˇ?(Oit|Θ),
gi(Θ, σξ) = Ti log(2piσ
2
ξ ) +
1
2σ2ξ
Ti∑
t
ξit(Θ)
2,
produce structural parameters that maximize the likelihood of observed data being generated
from the structural model.
Jørgensen (2013) shows that the estimation approach outlined in Example 1 can uncover
24Also, for each (Θ, φ) ∈ C, g should be Borel measurable on O.
25Ackerberg, Geweke and Hahn (2009) correct a result (Proposition 2) of Fernández-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramírez
and Santos (2006) stating that for the approximated likelihood to converge to the exact one the approximation
error should decrease faster than the increase in observations. Ackerberg, Geweke and Hahn (2009) reassuringly
show that this is not the case.
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parameters like the relative risk aversion, ρ, from similar models. For completeness, Table A2
reports mean (and standard deviation) of θ estimates from 50 independent simulations in which
measurement error is added with a known variance of one. The estimation approach uncovers
the true parameter, θ0, in even small samples.
Consumption is often assumed to be observed with multiplicative measurement error (Gour-
inchas and Parker, 2002; Alan, Attanasio and Browning, 2009 are examples). The proposed
framework can easily encompass this situation by letting ξit(Θ) = logC
data
it − log Cˇ?(Oit|Θ) and
letting g(·) correspond to a distributional assumption. If panel data is available, the measure-
ment error can be allowed to vary systematically across households, as illustrated in Example
2 in which the multiplicative measurement error are heterogeneous and arbitrarily distributed
with a constant variance, σξ.
Example 2 (Multiplicative Heterogeneous Measurement Error). If consumption data is contam-
inated with multiplicative measurement error systematically diﬀerent across households, then
ξit(Θ) = logC
data
it − log Cˇ?(Oit|Θ),
gi(Θ, σξ) =
Ti∑
t
|∆ξit(Θ)|,
produce consistent estimates of Θ and σ2ξ , independent of the distribution of the measurement
error. If, as assumed in Alan, Attanasio and Browning (2009), the measurement error is log-
normally distributed, letting gi(Θ, σξ) = Ti log(4piσ
2
ξ ) +
1
4σ2ξ
∑Ti
t (∆ξit(Θ))
2 would produce a
consistent ML estimator in this case.
Most of the examples are ML estimators but GMM estimators can easily be constructed
within this framework. Deﬁne p moments or auxiliary parameters (ap) from the data, λ, and
corresponding moments from the predictions of the model, λ(Θ), and let ξit(Θ) = λ − λ(Θ)
be the diﬀerence between these moments. Formulating gi(Θ, φ) = ξ(Θ)
′W (φ)−1ξ(Θ) as the
quadratic sum of diﬀerences, where W (φ) is some weight matrix, produce a GMM estimator
within the framework of equation (8).
The general framework also oﬀers a straight forward variance adjustment of two-step esti-
mators. Often some parameters of the model is calibrated or estimated in a ﬁrst-step procedure
and taken as given in the subsequent estimation of parameters of interest. Wooldridge (2002,
p. 361) discuss variance-adjustment and show applicable formulas for the general estimator
proposed here.
6 Empirical Applications: Danish Register Data and the PSID
I implement the suggested bounds and structural estimation strategy using two diﬀerent data
sources. First, high quality Danish administrative register data for the entire Danish population
is used providing reliable longitudinal information on relevant variables. Danish data has not
previously been used to uncover the eﬀect of children on household consumption so to present
results comparable to an existing literature, I also present results using the extensively used
PSID panel survey of US households.
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6.1 The Danish Registers
The high quality Danish administrative registers utilized here cover the entire population from
the period 1987-1996. All information are based on third party reports with little additional
self-reporting. All self-reporting are subject to possible auditing giving reliable longitudinal
information on household characteristics, wealth and income.
Household consumption is not observed in the registers and is imputed using a simple budget
approach,
Ct = Yt −∆At, (9)
where Yt is disposable income, At is end-of-period net wealth, and thus ∆At proxies savings.
This imputation method is evaluated on Danish data in Browning and Leth-Petersen (2003)
and found to produce a reasonable approximation. The resulting consumption measure will,
however, include some durables such as dishwasher etc. that might not be included in survey
measures of consumption and should be kept in mind when comparing results.
Net wealth consists of stocks, bonds, bank deposits, cars, boats, house value for home owners
and mortgage deeds net of total liabilities. The house value is assessed by the tax authorities
for tax purposes. The amounts held in speciﬁc stocks are not known, only the total value of all
stocks is.
Pension wealth is not included in the wealth measure. Information on pension accounts
are not available for most of the cohorts studied here and the resulting net wealth is, therefore,
slightly underestimated. Jørgensen (2007) shows that pension fund deposits are minor for young
households and increase until the age of retirement. Further, pension funds are non-liquid until
retirement and only few withdraw pension funds prematurely since heavy taxation leaves only
40% of prematurely withdrawn funds available for consumption purposes. Prematurely with-
drawn pension funds are included in the disposable income and since I focus on pre-retirement
behavior exclusion of pension wealth is expected to have only minor eﬀects on the results.
Disposable income include all labor market and non-labor market income net of all taxes.
Transfers, such as child care subsidies and unemployment beneﬁts, are also included such that
disposable income measures the ﬂow of resources available for consumption.
I restrict attention to continuously married and cohabiting couples in which the age of the
wife aged 25 to 59 to mitigate selection issues regarding educational and retirement choices. To
increase homogeneity of households, I restrict the spousal age diﬀerence to be no more than four
years. Households in which one adult is self-employed or out of the labor market are dropped
from the analysis. Hence, households with one or more unemployed individuals are included
but retirees are not. This is in order to construct a sample that is comparable to the existing
literature. Extreme or missing observations are also excluded from the analysis leaving an
unbalanced panel of 201,618 households observed in at most 9 periods with a total of 1,281,952
observations. Table A1 in Appendix A presents the sample selection criteria and their impact
on the population.
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6.2 The PSID
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) contains information on food consumption in
and out of home and has been used intensively for several purposes, including estimation of
the eﬀect of children on consumption. To study the evolution and link between income and
consumption inequality over the 1980s, Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) impute total
non-durable consumption for PSID households using food consumption measures in the CEX. I
use their data set and measure of total consumption and refer the reader to their discussion of
the PSID data.
The sample period used in Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) is 1978 to 1992 and only
male headed continuously married couples are used. The years 1987 and 1988 is not used since
consumption measures where not collected these years. Since the present study focus on the
eﬀect of children on household consumption, and I want the sample to be comparable to the
Danish sample, I restrict the sample to cover 25 to 59 year old households and link this to the
age of the wife.26 Further, I drop households in which the age diﬀerence between husband and
wife is larger than four years and the number of children is greater than three. I also drop
households who have children before age 15 or later than 40. This is a very small fraction and
an unbalanced panel of 2,350 households observed for at most 13 periods are in the ﬁnal sample
yielding a total of 17,005 non-missing observations.
Household resources are composed of after tax household income of both spouses and house-
hold assets. The PSID does not contain information on liabilities and, therefore, I do not include
house value in the measure of assets. The measure of resources in the PSID, therefore, diﬀers
signiﬁcantly from measure constructed for the Danish data but should still provide a reasonably
good proxy for consumption possibilities within a household.
The structural estimation approach outlined above requires knowledge on the age of each of
the (potential) three children. This information is not in the original Blundell, Pistaferri and
Preston (2008) data but is linked through the age of birth of each child in the PSID survey.
6.3 Calibrations
Some parameters of the model are calibrated and Table 4 reports the values and sources for these
parameters. The real gross interest rate, R, is calibrated to 1.03 for both countries, following
most of the literature, and the income growth rate, Gt, is estimated by average changes in log
income, for diﬀerent age groups. Figures A.9 and A.10 in Appendix A reports the income growth
rate proﬁle for Danish and US consumers, respectively.
When retired, US households are assumed to experience a constant decrease in permanent
income of 5 percent while income of Danish retirees are constant. This does not aﬀect the
results signiﬁcantly since the value of retirement, γ, will adjust accordingly. The exogenous
drop in permanent income when households retire, κ, is calibrated to 90 percent in Denmark
based on the median couple in the study by Ministry of Finance (2003). This implies a rather
high level of income from transfers post retirement and stems from generous public transfers
and private pension funds. Since the pension system is less generous in the US, I calibrate this
26Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) use households in which the husband is aged 30 to 65.
28
drop to be larger, 20 percent, when calibrating the model to the PSID data.
Table 4  Calibrated Parameters.
Denmark PSID
Value Source Value Source
Gt Fig. A.9 Own calculations: see text Fig. A.10 Own calculations: see text
R 1.03 Gourinchas and Parker (2002) 1.03 Gourinchas and Parker (2002)
κ −0.6 Own calculations: see text 0.00 Self imposed constraint
℘ 0.10 Own calculations: see text 0.003 Gourinchas and Parker (2002)
µ 0.30 Own calculations: see text 0.00 Gourinchas and Parker (2002)
κ 0.90 Ministry of Finance (2003) 0.80 Own calculations: see text
Gret 1.00 Own calculations: see text 0.95 Own calculations: see text
The low transitory income shock is calibrated such that with 0.3 percent probability US
households receive zero income (µUS = 0 and ℘US = .003), following Gourinchas and Parker
(2002). This implies that households would never want to leave zero resources to the next period
in fear of having to consume zero with a dis-utility of negative inﬁnity (hence κ does not aﬀect
the behavior and is set to zero). The social security system in Denmark is more compatible
with a 10 percent risk of income being reduced to 30 percent. Danish households are allowed to
be net-borrowers by 60 percent of annual permanent income. These three values are somewhat
arbitrary and have been chosen to provide reasonable ﬁt in the bottom distribution of resources
for households below age 40 and do not inﬂuence the results signiﬁcantly.
The permanent and transitory income shock variances are estimated following the approach
in Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). First, I run a regression of income on year dummies and the
resulting log residual income, y˜t, is used to calculate the permanent and transitory income shock
variances as
σˆ2η = cov(∆y˜t,∆y˜t+1 + ∆y˜t + ∆y˜t−1),
σˆ2ε = −cov(∆y˜t,∆y˜t+1).
Table 5 presents the estimated variance components for both data sources. The permanent
income shocks are found to be more volatile for high skilled households, a robust result in the
literature. The variance of transitory income shocks is, however, often found to be lower for high
skilled households. I ﬁnd the opposite here. The permanent income shocks account for slightly
more of the variation in income relative to the transitory shocks (σˆη > σˆε) in the PSID while
most existing studies report the opposite result.27 This is most likely due to the fact that i only
remove year eﬀects while most other studies include other deterministic components such as
the number of children and household age (Carroll and Samwick, 1997). However, since I want
to keep all of these aspects in the income and consumption measure, I believe it will be more
comparable to also include variation from such factors in the variance measure. As a robustness
check, the estimated income shock variances from Gourinchas and Parker (2002) has been used
27Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) report σ2η ∈ [.0057, 0.0333] and σ2ε ∈ [.0190, 0.0753] depending on the
combination of year, cohort and educational background, using the PSID. Gourinchas and Parker (2002), also
using the PSID, calibrate σ2η = 0.0212, σ
2
ε = 0.0440.
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without any signiﬁcant changes to the results (see Table A5).
Table 5  Permanent and Transitory Income Shock Variances.
All Low skilled High skilled
Est SE Est SE Est SE
Danish Registers
σˆ2η 0.0054 (0.000096) 0.0049 (0.000113) 0.0062 (0.000173)
σˆ2ε 0.0072 (0.000156) 0.0059 (0.000167) 0.0095 (0.000315)
PSID
σˆ2η 0.0785 (0.003898) 0.0756 (0.005973) 0.0815 (0.005004)
σˆ2ε 0.0510 (0.004452) 0.0476 (0.005374) 0.0543 (0.007086)
Notes: Estimates are based on the approach in Meghir and Pistaferri (2004).
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
The Danish income variances are an order of magnitude smaller than those for the US. This
is most likely due to the generous social welfare system and progressive taxation in Denmark.
Denmark has a relatively high minimum wage of around $20 per hour (in 2010) reducing the
volatility in permanent and transitory income shocks compared to, e.g., the US and the Danish
tax system is one of the worlds most progressive tax schedules with a marginal tax rate of more
than 60 percent in 2010 for top earners. Around 40 percent where top earners in 2010, reducing
the dispersion in disposable income signiﬁcantly compared to, e.g., the US.28
Unobserved permanent income, Pt, is uncovered by the Kalman Filter applied to each house-
hold's income process. Consult Appendix D for a description of the implementation. The arrival
rate of infants are estimated as a simple logit model on age dummies for each educational group
and number of children already present in the household. The arrival probabilities using Danish
registers and the PSID are presented in Figures A.7 and A.8, respectively.
6.4 Structural Estimation Results
For both data sources, I use the raw series only corrected for year-dummies through regressions
to avoid removing valuable variation over the life cycle that might be correlated with children.
The baseline assumption is that consumption, normalized with permanent income, is observed
with additive normal distributed measurement error. Results are robust to the distributional
assumption as robustness checks suggest.
Several versions of the model are estimated using each data set. First a model without any
household compositional eﬀects, then a functional form of the taste shifter similar to existing
literature, v(zt, θ) = exp(θ#children) is estimated, and, ﬁnally, a ﬂexible functional form is
28The Danish administrative registers also tend to be less noisy compared to surveys (Browning and Leth-
Petersen, 2003), reducing the transitory income shock variance.
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implemented,
v(zt, θ) = 1 + θ111{Age of child 1∈[0,10]} + θ121{Age of child 1 ∈[11,21]}
+θ211{Age of child 2∈[0,10]} + θ221{Age of child 1 and 2 ∈[11,21]}
+θ311{Age of child 3∈[0,10]} + θ321{Age of child 1, 2 and 3 ∈[11,21]},
allowing for an arbitrary children, age and scale eﬀect.
Table 6 presents the estimation results for low and high skilled Danish and US households.
The results are very similar across the two data sources, the estimated relative risk aversion
and discount factor are in the range normally found in the literature, and the model ﬁts the
actual consumption age proﬁles quite well, as reported in Figures A.11 and A.12 in Appendix A.
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS= ρ−1), increase when children have a positive
eﬀect on marginal utility of consumption. This stems from the fact that when marginal utility
of consumption increase in the presence of children, households are willing to substitute more
consumption to future periods when children arrives. This intertemporal substitution would
be captured in ρ when θ is ﬁxed at zero. The discount factor does not respond signiﬁcant to
inclusion of children.
As most of the literature, I ﬁnd that high skilled are more risk averse and more patient than
low skilled households using the Danish data. The opposite is the case for the PSID but stems
most likely from the fact that several post retirement parameters (γ, κ, Gret) are calibrated at
the same value across educational groups for the PSID households. Also, the estimated value of
ρ is aﬀected by the calibrated income shock variances, as discussed above when parameters are
calibrated. Since the focus here is on the estimation of θ, I have not investigated this further.
Turning to the parameters of interest, θ, both Danish and US households does not seem to
be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the presence of children. Although formal Likelihood Ratio (LR)
tests reject that θ = 0 for Danish households, the eﬀect is economically very small and even
negative for low skilled households.
For US households, the estimated eﬀects are larger around 0.2 − 0.3, close to the estimate
reported in Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber (1999) and some of the estimates reported in
Alan, Attanasio and Browning (2009). As in the latter study, the present estimates are very
imprecise and the LR test also suggests that parameters relating to children could be ignored.
Further, the ﬁt of the estimated model without children is signiﬁcantly better than the ﬁt of
the model with children, as shown in Figure A.12. In general, the estimates from the PSID is
much less robust to starting values and the amount of measurement error also is much larger
compared to the Danish register data.
There is a tendency to older children aﬀecting consumption more than younger children,
as found in Browning and Ejrnæs (2009) but, surprisingly and in contrast to their results, the
estimated parameters suggest that there is no economies of scale. For example, for high skilled
US households, the eﬀect of having a second child older than 10 years when a child in this age
group is already present increase the marginal value of consumption with more than the ﬁrst
child did.
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Table 6  Estimated Preference Parameters, Danish Registers and PSID.
Danish Registers PSID
Low skilled High skilled Low skilled High skilled
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
ρ Risk aversion 2.316 2.363 2.385 2.639 2.626 2.634 2.051 1.747 1.596 1.828 1.984 1.495
(0.041) (0.036) (0.043) (0.057) (0.062) (0.063) (0.738) (0.439) NA (0.470) (1.061) (0.020)
β Discount factor 0.965 0.964 0.964 0.973 0.973 0.972 0.948 0.965 0.966 0.931 0.939 0.948
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.021) (0.009) NA (0.020) (0.037) (0.013)
γ Retirement 1.454 1.492 1.491 1.251 1.245 1.265 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025)
σξ Meas. err. 0.468 0.468 0.468 0.490 0.490 0.490 1.343 1.342 1.342 3.582 3.582 3.582
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
v(z; θ) = exp(θ′z)
θ # of children −0.017 0.004 0.224 0.326
(0.002) (0.003) (0.098) (0.361)
v(z; θ) = 1 + θ′z
θ11 1. child ≤ 10 −0.004 −0.008 0.117 −0.087
(0.007) (0.010) (0.288) (0.549)
θ12 1. child > 10 −0.031 0.002 0.353 0.247
(0.004) (0.008) (0.292) (0.530)
θ21 2. child ≤ 10 −0.034 −0.015 0.158 0.158
(0.005) (0.008) (0.221) (0.521)
θ22 2. child > 10 −0.006 0.000 0.023 0.320
(0.005) (0.008) (0.313) (0.653)
θ31 3. child ≤ 10 −0.005 0.022 0.535 −0.016
(0.009) (0.012) NA (0.676)
θ32 3. child > 10 0.019 0.021 0.277 0.630
(0.013) (0.017) (0.483) (0.369)
−L(Θ) 0.46536 0.46533 0.46529 0.49868 0.49863 0.49862 0.83299 0.83269 0.83263 1.13714 1.13710 1.13706
LR [p-val] 67.1[0.00] 153.4[0.00] 57.1[0.00] 68.8[0.00] 8.7[0.00] 10.4[0.11] 1.6[0.21] 2.9[0.82]
Observations 851, 249 430, 703 8, 333 8, 672
Notes: Standard errors are based on the inverse of the hessian. "NA" refers to Not Available and stems from the hessian being close to singular and the resulting parameter variances
are negative. This indicates that the objective function is ﬂat within numerical precision and the estimates and standard errors should be interpreted with causion. For US households,
using the PSID, the retirement motive is ﬁxed across educational groups to be 1.3 based on results for Danish households.
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The results are very robust. Changing the objective function to a Logistic distribution or
absolute diﬀerences does not aﬀect the estimated eﬀect of children signiﬁcantly, as reported in
Table A3. Further, allowing for heterogeneous multiplicative distribution-free measurement error
(Example 2 in Section 5) does not change the results (see Table A5). Also, calibrating the
transitory and permanent income variance to those used in Gourinchas and Parker (2002) does
not change the results (Table A5).
The diﬀerence between the results across US and Denmark could be due to diﬀerences in
the consumption measures used. The Danish consumption measure eﬀectively includes some
durables such as dishwashers and other smaller household appliances while the US measure is
imputed from food consumption measures in the PSID and CEX. This diﬀerence is likely to
produce a measure including more than non-durable consumption for Denmark and a measure
of consumption in the PSID to closely related to food consumption, a consumption component
likely more aﬀected by the presence of children than total non-durable consumption. Also, the
labor market responses to arrival of children is likely to diﬀer across the two countries.
The assumption that children arrive probabilistically is expected to produce lower estimates
of the eﬀect of children, compared to deterministic or endogenous arrival of children. This is
because all households within a given age group have the same expected children-related expen-
ditures and, therefore, suggest that all households should decrease consumption in anticipation
of children. If this is not how households perceive the world, the estimate of θ would be forced
downwards by households who know that they will have children, say, late in the life cycle and
therefore does not increase savings as much as the model would suggest when young.
Table A4 reports unchanged estimation results from a deterministic version of the model, in
which households know with perfect foresight how many and when children will arrive, using the
PSID. Since this model requires knowledge on completed fertility, I made the crude assumption
that observed fertility is completed fertility.29 Since endogenous fertility choice is in between
the two opposite extreme models (stochastic versus deterministic arrival of children) producing
identical results, the results is expected not to change if children where endogenously chosen.
The eﬀect of children on consumption is surprisingly low. Inspecting the raw consumption
data show an intriguing pattern that might explain this result: Total non-durable consumption
is not aﬀected much by children, but the composition of consumption goods might be. Figure
A.13 in Appendix A reports consumption age proﬁles for PSID households who have at least
one child at age 30 and households who are childless at age 30. Proﬁles are shown for (a) food at
home, (b) food out, (c) total food consumption, and (d) the imputed non-durable consumption
constructed in Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) and used throughout the present study.
Expenditures on food at home is on average higher for households who have children while
food out is on average higher for households who have no children. Total food consumption
and non-durable consumption does, however, not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across households who have
children and childless households at age 30. This indicates that children might shift consump-
tion from luxury goods (food out) towards necessary goods (food home) while leaving total
expenditures almost unaﬀected.30
29Alternatively, outside the scope of this paper, an estimated completed fertility could be used (see Browning
and Ejrnæs, 2009).
30Aguiar and Hurst (2013) argue that food out is related to labor market activities and the drop in food out
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6.5 Reduced Form Bounds
Table 7  Log-Linear Euler Equation Estimation Results, ρ̂−1θ.
Low Skilled High Skilled
Lower† Upper‡ ∆zt ∆zt Lower† Upper‡ ∆zt ∆zt
Denmark 0.027 0.145 0.031 0.210 0.020 0.183 0.043 0.210
(0.005) (0.011) (0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.015) (0.004) (0.012)
PSID 0.019 0.105 0.079 0.158 0.058 0.153 0.076 0.205
(0.037) (0.073) (0.024) (0.060) (0.024) (0.186) (0.027) (0.143)
Notes: Reported estimates are ρ̂−1θ with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Estimates from PSID
is based on food consumption at home. Estimates using Danish register data is based on imputed
consumption using income and wealth information.
† Lower bound is the estimate from a log-linearized Euler equation using only households in which the
wife is age 45 or above.
‡ Upper bound is the estimate from a log-linearized Euler equation using ∆zt as instrument and
restricting the sample to households in which the wife is age 45 or below.
Table 7 reports the estimated bounds of ρ−1θ for the Danish and US data using the log-
linearized Euler equation (3). Recall that Section 4.2 argued that a lower bound on θ can be
estimated using the household level change in number of children (∆zt) while restricting the
sample to include only older households. The estimated lower bounds are reported in column
one and ﬁve for low and high skilled households, respectively. An upper bound can be found by
using the cohort-average number of children (∆zt) as an instrument while restricting the sample
to younger households. The resulting upper bounds are reported in columns two and six.
As reference, and to conﬁrm that the PSID sample used herein and Danish data are very
similar to the data used in the literature, I also report estimates including all households. The
estimates are very similar to estimates reported in the literature. Alan, Attanasio and Browning
(2009) using the household level change in number of children, ∆zt, report an estimate of .045 and
I estimate .079, both using the PSID. The estimate for Denmark is slightly lower and even closer
at around .03 − .04. When using the cohort-average number of children as an instrument, the
estimates increase signiﬁcantly to around .2, very similar to estimates reported in the literature
(Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber, 1999 estimates ρ−1θ to be .21, using the CEX).
Assuming that the relative risk aversion is as estimated in column (2) Table 6, bounds of the
eﬀect of children can be found as ρˆ × ρ̂−1θ as reported in Table 8.31 Although the bounds are
rather wide, they suggest that what have typically been reported in the literature, using Euler
equation estimation methods, is close to (and outside) the upper bound, while the structural
estimation results I present is closer (and below) to the lower bounds. The eﬀect of children, thus,
might be much smaller than what have previously been assumed in the literature. Speciﬁcally,
the reported estimate of ρ−1θ in Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber (1999) of 0.21 and ρ−1
of 0.64 produce an eﬀect of children on consumption around θˆ ≈ 0.33, close to the upper bound
and increase in food home over the life cycle is interpreted as being caused by lower labor market participation
of older households. The suggestive evidence I report oﬀer an alternative explanation and interesting avenues for
future research.
31I use the estimated risk aversion parameters from column (2) because the bounds are derived from a model
with that taste shifter speciﬁcation, v(z; θ) = exp(θ′z), typically applied in the literature.
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Figure 6  Estimated Upper and Lower Bounds for Varying Cut-oﬀ Ages.
of high skilled households using the PSID.
The bounds reported in Table 7 and 8 have been estimated using 45 as the age at which the
sample is split between young and older households. As discussed above, this is subject to a
fair amount of arbitrariness. Figure 6 presents the lower and upper bounds of ρ̂−1θ for varying
cut-oﬀ ages. The top panel, (a) and (b), are constructed such that increasingly older households
are included from age 25 through 59 while in the bottom panel, (c) and (d), increasingly younger
households are included from age 59 through 25.
The lower bounds form an U-shape as increasingly younger households are included similar
to the ones found on simulated data (see Figure 4). In contrast, the upper bounds diﬀer from
the ones found using simulated data (Figure 5). Including increasingly older households seem
to monotonically increase the estimated eﬀect of children. This could, e.g., arise from older
children having a larger impact on marginal utility or younger cohorts being less aﬀected by the
presence of children relative to older cohorts.
The bounds are derived from a stylized model and other signiﬁcant life cycle motives such as
labor market participation and consumption of durables such as housing is likely to diﬀer over
the life cycle. Also, if children aﬀect household income, the bounds will be invalid. Investigating
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Table 8  Bounds of the Eﬀect of Children on Consumption, θ ∈ [θ, θ].
Danish Registers PSID
Low skilled High skilled Low skilled High skilled
Lower bound, θ 0.064 0.053 0.033 0.115
Upper bound, θ 0.343 0.481 0.183 0.304
Notes: Reported estimates are ρˆ× ρ̂−1θ where ρˆ is the estimated risk aversion param-
eter from columns (2) in Table 6 and ρ̂−1θ is the estimated lower and upper bounds
from Table 7.
these potentially important factors and choices in the present model is fascinating for future
research, but is outside the scope of this paper.
7 Concluding Discussion
Throughout this study, the eﬀect of children on non-durable consumption has been analyzed.
Building on a standard buﬀer stock model in which the marginal utility is allowed to depend on
the number and age of children, I show that reduced form estimators based on the consumption
Euler equation produce inconsistent estimates of the eﬀect of children if households face credit
constraints. Many of the results hold even if households do not face credit constraints but instead
face a positive probability of receiving a low income shock, a speciﬁcation used in, e.g., Carroll
(1997) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
Utilizing the Euler equation bias, I provide a tractable method to estimating a lower and
upper bound on the eﬀect of children on household consumption when credit constraints aﬀect
household behavior. I show that using only young households and a suitable instrument, an
upper bound of the eﬀect of children on consumption can be estimated and if the eﬀect of
children is large enough, this upper bound (almost) equals the true parameter. In the same line
of thought, I argue that using only older households can be used to estimate a lower bound.
Finally, I have proposed a ﬂexible structural estimation strategy in which the economic envi-
ronment of consumers is fully speciﬁed and optimal consumption behavior is found numerically
for given parameter values. This approach overcomes limitations of the bound estimation ap-
proach such as simultaneous estimation of all relevant preference parameters, measurement error
in consumption and potentially binding credit constraints. Using this approach, I estimate the
eﬀect of children on household consumption using both the PSID for the US and high quality
Danish administrative register data of the entire population. Results suggest that the eﬀect of
children reported in the existing literature is in the range of the upper bound while the estimates
from the structural estimation approach are close to the lower bound.
Several interesting avenues for future research remains. The ﬁnding of small eﬀects of chil-
dren on non-durable consumption is likely to camouﬂage signiﬁcant shifts in the composition
of expenditures within a household. Speciﬁcally, the arrival of children may shift expenditures
from luxury goods towards more necessary goods while leaving the total expenditures almost
unaﬀected.
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A Additional Figures and Tables
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0.98
0.99
1
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
Age
Figure A.1  Income Growth Proﬁle used in Simulations.
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Figure A.2  Estimated Arrival Probability of Infant (PSID) and Simulated Number of Children.
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(a) Structural Euler Residual, 
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Figure A.3  Euler Residuals, Model Without Explicit Credit Constraint, but ℘ = 0.003,
µ = 0.
(a) Upper Bound, θ0 = 0.0
30 35 40 45 50 55 60
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Oldest household included
 
 
∆zt
∆zt
θ0
(b) Upper Bound, θ0 = 0.1
30 35 40 45 50 55 60
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Oldest household included
(c) Upper Bound, θ0 = 0.5
30 35 40 45 50 55 60
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Oldest household included
(d) Lower Bound, θ0 = 0.0
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Figure A.4  Lower and Upper Bounds, Log-linear Euler. Model Without Explicit Credit
Constraint, but ℘ = 0.003, µ = 0.
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(a) GMM, θ0 = 0.0
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(b) GMM, θ0 = 0.1
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25 30 35 40 45 50 55
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Youngest household included
(f) LogLin, θ0 = 0.5
25 30 35 40 45 50 55
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Youngest household included
Figure A.5  Estimation on Sub-samples, from age 59 through 25. Deterministic Model.
(a) GMM, θ0 = 0.0
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(b) GMM, θ0 = 0.1
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Figure A.6  Estimation on Sub-samples, from age 25 through 59. Deterministic Model.
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Table A1  Sample Selection Criteria, Danish Data.
Household-time
observations
Share of
original sample
Original, all couples 16,268,110 1.000
Wife age 8,832,011 0.543
Husband age 5,874,962 0.361
No information on education 5,848,884 0.360
No more than 3 children 5,716,046 0.351
Both in labor force 2,238,076 0.138
No negative disposable income 2,231,204 0.137
Child outside allowed range 2,230,326 0.137
Extreme observations 1,522,994 0.094
Resources missing 1,281,952 0.079
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Figure A.7  Actual and Predicted Arrival of Infant. Female Age proﬁles for Low and High
skilled Households. Danish Data.
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Figure A.8  Actual and Predicted Arrival of Infant. Female Age proﬁles for Low and High
skilled Households. PSID.
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Figure A.9  Age Proﬁle of Income Growth, Gˆt, Danish Data.
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Figure A.10  Age Proﬁle of Income Growth, Gˆt, PSID.
Table A2  Monte Carlo Results, Structural Estimation.
θ0 = 0.0 θ0 = 0.1 θ0 = 0.3 θ0 = 0.5
N = 1000, T = 5 0.004 0.115 0.300 0.504
(0.034) (0.062) (0.099) (0.080)
N = 1000, T = 20 −0.000 0.106 0.307 0.510
(0.017) (0.039) (0.078) (0.057)
N = 50000, T = 5 0.000 0.099 0.299 0.501
(0.005) (0.010) (0.017) (0.013)
N = 50000, T = 20 0.000 0.100 0.301 0.502
(0.002) (0.004) (0.010) (0.009)
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) are reported. All
results are based on 50 independent estimations on simulated data from
the model described in Section 3 with the parameters presented in Table
2. See footnote to Table 3.
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Figure A.11  Actual and Predicted Consumption proﬁles, Danish Data.
Table A3  Robustness Check: Alternative Objective Functions.
Danish Registers PSID
Low skilled High skilled Low skilled High skilled
Logistic Abs Logistic Abs Logistic Abs Logistic Abs
ρ 1.565 0.588 1.986 1.245 1.272 1.148 1.821 1.956
(0.076) (0.054) (0.219) NA
β 0.973 0.974 0.981 0.982 0.976 0.982 0.950 0.960
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) NA
γ† 1.152 1.010 1.013 0.921 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300
(0.013) (0.010) (1.300) (1.300)
σξ 0.421 0.444 0.483 0.626
(0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.007)
θ11 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.010 0.201 0.181 0.139 0.309
(0.004) (0.007) (0.091) (0.149)
θ12 −0.008 −0.002 0.021 0.015 0.269 0.172 0.372 0.385
(0.002) (0.005) (0.085) (0.121)
θ21 −0.010 −0.003 0.003 0.004 0.057 0.044 0.068 −0.018
(0.003) (0.005) (0.062) (0.120)
θ22 0.006 0.003 0.012 0.009 0.075 0.099 0.205 0.175
(0.003) (0.005) (0.082) (0.126)
θ31 0.006 0.005 0.028 0.015 0.258 0.234 0.143 0.236
(0.005) (0.008) (0.116) (0.141)
θ32 0.014 0.006 0.018 0.004 0.092 0.098 0.562 0.661
(0.007) (0.011) (0.131) (0.262)
Notes: Standard errors are based on the inverse of the hessian. "NA" refers to Not
Available and stems from the hessian being close to singular and the resulting parame-
ter variances are negative. This indicates that the objective function is ﬂat within nu-
merical precision and the estimates and standard errors should be interpreted with causion.
"Logistic" refers to results assuming additive Logistically distributed measurement error in no-
malized consumption. "Abs" refers to results from minimizing the absolute diﬀerence between
observed and predicted consumption. Standard errors are not reported since these should be
bootstrapped due to the non-diﬀerentiability of objective function at zero.
† For US households, using the PSID, the retirement motive is ﬁxed across educational groups to
be 1.3 based on results for Danish households.
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Figure A.12  Actual and Predicted Consumption proﬁles Relative to age 26, PSID.
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(d) Non-durable consumption (imputed)
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Figure A.13  Consumption Components for Households With and Without Children, PSID.
46
Table A4  Estimated Preference Parameters, PSID. Deterministic Arrival of Children.
Low skilled High skilled
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
ρ Risk aversion 1.829 1.702 1.605 1.828 1.953 1.431
NA (1.096) NA (0.662) (0.785) NA
β Discount factor 0.954 0.965 0.963 0.931 0.939 0.948
NA (0.021) (0.005) (0.027) (0.047) NA
γ† Retirement 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300
σξ Meas, err. 1.343 1.355 1.355 3.582 3.538 3.537
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Taste shifter, v(z; θ) = exp(θ′z)
θ # of children 0.179 0.271
(0.118) (0.328)
Taste shifter, v(z; θ) = 1 + θ′z
θ11 1. child ≤ 10 −0.016 −0.141
(0.173) NA
θ12 1. child > 10 0.186 0.149
NA NA
θ21 2. child ≤ 10 0.154 0.144
NA (0.408)
θ22 2. child > 10 0.056 0.308
NA NA
θ31 3. child ≤ 10 0.337 0.070
NA (0.470)
θ32 3. child > 10 0.149 0.348
NA (0.462)
−L(Θ) 0.83295 0.82087 0.82083 1.13714 1.09120 1.09117
LR [p-val] 353.3[0.00] 354.3[0.00] 1612.1[0.00] 1613.1[0.00]
# of observations 8, 333 8, 333 8, 333 8, 672 8, 672 8, 672
Notes: Standard errors are based on the inverse of the hessian. "NA" refers to Not Available and stems from
the hessian being close to singular and the resulting parameter variances are negative. This indicates that the
objective function is ﬂat within numerical precision and the estimates and standard errors should be interpreted
with causion.
† The retirement motive is ﬁxed across educational groups to be 1.3.
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Table A5  Robustness Checks: Income Variance and Heterogeneous Measurement
Error, PSID.
Probabilistic Arrival of Children Deterministic Arrival of Children
Low skilled High skilled Low skilled High skilled
G&P Het. G&P Het. G&P Het. G&P Het.
ρ 1.596 2.411 1.495 1.930 1.605 2.459 1.431 1.903
NA (0.020) NA NA
β‡ 0.966 0.950 0.948 0.950 0.963 0.950 0.948 0.950
NA (0.013) (0.005) NA
γ† 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.300
σξ 1.342 3.582 1.355 3.537
(0.011) (0.029) (0.011) (0.030)
θ11 0.117 −0.355 −0.087 0.115 −0.016 −0.139 −0.141 0.046
(0.288) (0.549) (0.173) NA
θ12 0.353 −0.362 0.247 0.078 0.186 −0.131 0.149 0.021
(0.292) (0.530) NA NA
θ21 0.158 −0.084 0.158 −0.054 0.154 −0.242 0.144 −0.126
(0.221) (0.521) NA (0.408)
θ22 0.023 0.017 0.320 0.285 0.056 −0.155 0.308 −0.103
(0.313) (0.653) NA NA
θ31 0.535 −0.183 −0.016 −0.241 0.337 −0.118 0.070 −0.082
NA (0.676) NA (0.470)
θ32 0.277 −0.119 0.630 0.087 0.149 −0.158 0.348 0.029
(0.483) (0.369) NA (0.462)
Notes: Standard errors are based on the inverse of the hessian. "NA" refers to Not
Available and stems from the hessian being close to singular and the resulting parame-
ter variances are negative. This indicates that the objective function is ﬂat within nu-
merical precision and the estimates and standard errors should be interpreted with causion.
"G&P" refers to a model in which the permanent and transitory income variances are calibrated
to those found in Gourinchas and Parker (2002), ση = 0.0212 and σε = 0.0440 respectively.
"Het." refers to heterogeneous multiplicative measurement error in consumption, as in Example
2 in Section 5.
† The retirement motive is ﬁxed across educational groups to be 1.3.
‡ The discount factor, β is ﬁxed at 0.95 when allowing for heterogeneous multiplicative measure-
ment error. Using ﬁrst diﬀerences in log consumption eﬀectively only utilize information on
households with at least two consecutive periods. The reduced number of observations in eﬀect
made joint identiﬁcation of ρ and β impossible.
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B Solving the Four-Period Model
All variables are normalized with income. Hence, e.g., m1 = (A0 + Y1)/Y1 = G
−1
1 a0 + 1 since
Y1 = G1Y0. In all other periods, income is constant. This normalization facilitates solving
the model analytically for all possible values of income. The resulting consumption function
should be multiplied with current period income to give the unnormalized level of consumption,
C?t = Ytc
?
t . The consumption functions in periods one, two and three are independent of whether
children arrive deterministically or probabilistically, since it is assumed that children, if present
in period one, will move with certainty in period two. Therefore, I ﬁrst solve for optimal
consumption in period three, two and one and then turn to the initial period consumption, prior
to potential arrival of children. This analysis is split between the model in which children arrive
deterministically and the model in which children arrive probabilistically.
In the terminal period, period three, all resources are consumed (c?3 = m3) and the uncon-
strained Euler equation linking period two and period three consumption is then
c−ρ2 = m
−ρ
3
such that inserting normalized resources, m3 = m2− c2 + 1 and re-arranging shows that optimal
consumption in period two is given by,
c?2(m2) = min
{
m2 ,
1
2
(m2 + 1)
}
, (10)
where I have used that consumption cannot exceed available resources. In period one, a child
may be present, such that the unconstrained Euler equation is given by
c−ρ1 exp(θz1) = c
−ρ
2 ,
such that inserting normalized resources and re-arranging yields,
c?1(m1|z1) = min
{
m1 ,
m1 + 2
1 + 2 exp(−ρ−1θz1)
}
, (11)
where I have used that only if nothing is saved in period one (c?1(m1|z1) = m1) will consumption
on period two equal available resources. Since income is constant across period one and two (and
three) the Euler equation linking period one and period two consumption is valid as long as period
one consumption is less than the available resources (c?1(m1|z1) < m1) and else c?1(m1|z1) = m1
and c?1(m2) = m2. Intuitively, if the constraint is not binding in period one, in which children
might be present, it will certainly not be binding in the subsequent period.
Optimal consumption in the initial period depends on whether children arrive determinis-
tically or probabilistically in period one. I ﬁrst derive optimal consumption in the case where
children arrive deterministically and then turn to the probabilistic arrival of children.
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B.1 Initial Period Consumption: Deterministic Arrival of Children
In the ﬁrst period, the unconstrained Euler equation is
c−ρ0 = G
−ρ
1 exp(θz1)c
−ρ
1 ,
since income grows with a factor G1 from period zero to period one. Since consumption in period
one is potentially constrained, this has to be explicitly taken into account. First, assuming
that period one consumption is less than available resources, c1 < m1, inserting the optimal
consumption found in (11) and tedious re-arranging yields optimal consumption in this case,
c?0(m0|z1)det|c1<m1 =
m0 + 3G1
3 + exp(ρ−1θz1)
. (12)
If, on the other hand, consumption in period one is constrained (c1 = m1), inserting this in
the Euler equation and re-arranging yields,
c?0(m0|z1)det|c1=m1 =
m0 +G1
1 + exp(ρ−1θz1)
. (13)
To determine which of the consumption functions is relevant, note that equation (12) would
imply a too high level of consumption in period zero if ignoring, that at some point, consumption
in period one would be constrained because too little is saved in period zero. Hence,
c˜?0(m0|z1)det = min
{
m0 ,
m0 +G1
1 + exp(ρ−1θz1)
,
m0 + 3G1
3 + exp(ρ−1θz1)
}
,
where the level of period zero resources implying that consumption in period one is constrained
is the level of resources, m0 ≤ exp(ρ−1θz1)G1, that solves,
m0 +G1
1 + exp(ρ−1θz1)
≤ m0 + 3G1
3 + exp(ρ−1θz1)
,
such that when m0 ≤ exp(ρ−1θz1)G1 optimal consumption in period zero is given by equation
(13) and when m0 > exp(ρ
−1θz1)G1 optimal consumption in period zero is given by equation
(12).
When households are initiated with zero wealth (a−1 = 0) available normalized resources
in period zero is one, m0 = 1, and only equation (13) is relevant. This is because m0 = 1 ≤
exp(ρ−1θz1)G1 for all values of θ ≥ 0 and G1 ≥ 1. Therefore, assuming no initial wealth and
deterministic arrival of children, optimal consumption in period zero is given by
c?0(m0|z1)det = min
{
m0 ,
m0 +G1
1 + exp(ρ−1θz1)
}
. (14)
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B.2 Initial Period Consumption: Probabilistic Arrival of Children
The analysis, if children arrive probabilistically, is slightly more complicated than the above
where children arrive deterministically. The unconstrained Euler equation is here given by
c−ρ0 = G
−ρ
1 c
−ρ
1 (p exp(θ) + 1− p),
such that in case where period one consumption is unconstrained (c1 < m1), inserting optimal
consumption from equation (11) and re-arranging yields
c?0(m0)|c1<m1 =
m0 + 3G1
1 + [p (exp(ρ−1θ) + 2)ρ + (1− p)3ρ] 1ρ
. (15)
However, if households are potentially credit constrained if a child arrives next period, the
model has in general no analytical solution because the Euler equation is
c−ρ0 = G
−ρ
1
[
c−ρ1 (1− p) + p exp(θ)m−ρ1
]
,
= G−ρ1
[
[
1
3
(G−11 (m0 − c0) + 3)]−ρ(1− p) + p exp(θ)
[
G−11 (m0 − c0) + 1
]−ρ]
,
with no general analytical solution for c0. To complete arguments, I solve for the optimal
consumption numerically using the EGM proposed by Carroll (2006), and use that solution,
denoted c?0(m0)|numc1=m1 . We have that optimal period zero consumption is given by
c?0(m0) = min
{
m0 , c
?
0(m0)|numc1=m1 ,
m0 + 3G1
1 + [p (exp(ρ−1θ) + 2)ρ + (1− p)3ρ] 1ρ
}
, (16)
where Figure B.1a reports the consumption function in the stochastic case for the baseline
parameters used herein (p = 0.5, ρ = 2, and θ = 0.5). Figure B.1b reports the consumption
function in the deterministic case. The numerical solution is also reported to conﬁrm the results.
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Figure B.1  Period Zero Optimal Consumption Functions.
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B.3 Small Upwards Bias of IV using Young Households Without Credit
Constraints
Here, I show that in the model where children arrive probabilistically, when the eﬀect of children
on consumption is large enough to eﬀectively dominate the credit constraint, there is only a small
positive bias from IV estimation. The IV estimator is
E[∆ logC ′1Z]
E[Z ′Z]
=
1
p
(p∆ log(C1)|z1=1 + (1− p)∆ log(C1)|z1=0),
such that inserting optimal consumption in absence of credit constraints,
C0 = Y0
m0 + 3G1
1 + [p (exp(ρ−1θ) + 2)ρ + (1− p)3ρ] 1ρ
, C1(z1) = Y1
m1 + 2
1 + 2 exp(−ρ−1θz1) ,
yields
E[∆ logC ′1Z]
E[Z ′Z]
= log
(
Y1
m1 + 2
1 + 2 exp(−ρ−1θ)
)
− log
(
Y0
m0 + 3G1
1 + [p (exp(ρ−1θ) + 2)ρ + (1− p)3ρ] 1ρ
)
+ (1− p)/p
(
log
(
Y1
1
3
(m1 + 2)
)
− log
(
Y0
m0 + 3G1
1 + [p (exp(ρ−1θ) + 2)ρ + (1− p)3ρ] 1ρ
))
= ((1 + (1− p)/p)) log(m1 + 2) + log
(
exp(ρ−1θ)
exp(ρ−1θ) + 2
)
− (1− p)/p log (3) + p−1 log(G1)
− (1 + (1− p)/p) log
(
m0 + 3G1
1 + [p (exp(ρ−1θ) + 2)ρ + (1− p)3ρ] 1ρ
)
= ρ−1θ + p−1 log(G1)− (log
(
exp(ρ−1θ) + 2
)
+ (1− p)/p log (3))
+p−1
[
log(m1 + 2)− log
(
m0 + 3G1
1 + [p (exp(ρ−1θ) + 2)ρ + (1− p)3ρ] 1ρ
)]
= ρ−1θ − (log (exp(ρ−1θ) + 2)+ (1− p)/p log (3))
+p−1
[
log
(
G1
m1 + 2
m0 + 3G1
)
+ log
(
1 +
[
p
(
exp(ρ−1θ) + 2
)ρ
+ (1− p)3ρ] 1ρ)]
= ρ−1θ − (log (exp(ρ−1θ) + 2)+ (1− p)/p log (3))
+p−1
[
log
(
m0 + 3G1 − c0
m0 + 3G1
)
+ log
(
1 +
[
p
(
exp(ρ−1θ) + 2
)ρ
+ (1− p)3ρ] 1ρ)] ,
where inserting again c0 from equation (15) and re-arranging ﬁnally gives the IV estimator as
ρ−1θ + ω, where
ω ≡ p−1 [ρ−1 log (p (exp(ρ−1θ) + 2)ρ + (1− p)3ρ)− (p log (exp(ρ−1θ) + 2)+ (1− p) log (3))] ≥ 0,
such that deﬁning ω1 ≡ (exp(ρ−1θ) + 2)ρ and ω2 ≡ 3ρ, the bias of the IV estimator can be seen
to be the diﬀerence in the log-expected value and the expected log value;
ω = p−1ρ−1(log(pω1 + (1− p)ω2)− (p logω1 + (1− p) logω2)),
which is always positive since the logarithm is a concave function.
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C Solving the Baseline Structural Model
To reduce the number of state variables, all relations are normalized by permanent income, Pt,
and small letter variables denote normalized quantities (e.g., ct = Ct/Pt). The model is solved
recursively by backwards induction, starting with the terminal period, T . Within a given period,
optimal consumption is found using the Endogenous Grid Method (EGM) by Carroll (2006).
The EGM constructs a grid over end-of-period wealth, at, rather than beginning-of-period
resources, mt. Denote this grid of Q points as aˆt = (at, a
1
t , . . . , a
Q−1
t ) in which at is a lower
bound on end-of-period wealth that I will discuss in great detail below. The endogenous level of
beginning-of-period resources consistent with end-of-period assets, aˆt, and optimal consumption,
c?t , is given by mt = aˆt + c
?
t (mt, zt).
In the terminal period, independent of the presence of children, households consume all their
remaining wealth, cT = mT . In preceding periods, in which households are retired, consumption
across periods satisfy the Euler equation
u′(ct) = max
{
u′(mt) , Rβ
v(zt+1; θ)
v(zt; θ)
u′(ct+1)
}
, ∀t ∈ [Tr, T ],
where consumption cannot exceed available resources. When retired, households do not produce
new oﬀspring and the age of children (zt) evolves deterministically.
The normalized consumption Euler equation in periods prior to retirement is given by
u′(ct) = max
{
u′(mt + κ) , RβEt
[
v(zt+1; θ)
v(zt; θ)
u′(ct+1Gt+1ηt+1)
]}
, ∀t < Tr,
such that when aˆt > −κ optimal consumption can be found by inverting the Euler equation
c?t (mt, zt) =
(
βREt
[
v(zt+1; θ)
v(zt; θ)
(Gt+1ηt+1)
−ρcˇ?t+1((Gt+1ηt+1)
−1Raˆt + εt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=mt+1
, zt+1)
−ρ
])− 1
ρ
,
where cˇ?t+1(mt+1, zt+1) is a linear interpolation function of optimal consumption next period,
found in the last iteration. Since aˆt is the constructed grid, it is trivial to determine in which
regions the credit constraint is binding and not. I will discuss this in detail below.
The expectations are over next period arrival of children (zt+1) and transitory (εt+1) and per-
manent income shocks (ηt+1). Eight Gauss-Hermite quadrature points are used for each income
shock to approximate expectations. Q = 80 discrete grid points are used in aˆt to approximate
the consumption function with more mass at lower levels of wealth to approximate accurately the
curvature of the consumption function. The number of points was chosen such that the change
i the optimized log likelihood did not change signiﬁcantly, as proposed in Fernández-Villaverde,
Rubio-Ramírez and Santos (2006).
The arrival probability of a child next period is a function of the wife's age and number of
children today, pit+1(zt). No more than three children can live inside a household at a given
point in time and infants cannot arrive when the household is older than 43. The next period's
state is therefore calculated by increasing the age of children by one and if the age is 21, the
child moves. In principle, there is 223 = 10, 648 combinations three children can be either not
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present (NC) or aged zero through 20. To reduce computation time, children are organized such
that child one is the oldest at all times, the second child is the second oldest and child three is
the youngest child. To illustrate, imagine a household which in period t has, say, two children
aged 20 and 17, zt = (age1,t = 20, age2,t = 17, age3,t = NC), then, in period t+1, only one child
will be present; zt+1 = (age1,t+1 = 18, age2,t+1 = NC, age3,t+1 = NC), given no new oﬀspring
arrives. Had new oﬀspring arrived, then age2,t+1 = 0.
C.1 Credit Constraint and Utility Induced Constraints
Since the EGM works with end-of-period wealth rather than beginning-of-period resources, credit
constraints can easily be implemented by adjusting the lowest point in the grid, at. The po-
tentially binding credit constraint next period is implemented by the rule, c?t+1 = mt+1 if mt+1
is lower than some threshold level, m?t+1. Including the credit constraint as the lowest point,
at+1 = −κ, the lowest level of resources endogenously determined in the last iteration, mt+1, is
the exact level of resources where households are on the cusp of being credit constrained, i.e.,
m?t+1 = mt+1. This ensures a very accurate interpolation and requires no additional handling of
shadow prices of resources in the constrained Euler equation, denoted λt+1 in Section 2.
Besides the exogenous credit constraint, κ, a natural or utility induced self-imposed con-
straint can be relevant such that the procedure described above should be modiﬁed slightly. This
is because households want to accumulate enough wealth to buﬀer against a series of extremely
bad income shocks to ensure strictly positive consumption in all periods even in the worst case
possible.
Proposition 1. The lowest possible value of normalized end-of-period wealth consistent with the
model, periods prior to retirement, can be calculated as
at = −min{Ωt, κ} ∀t ≤ Tr − 2
where, denoting the lowest possible values of the transitory and permanent income shock as ε,
and η, respectively, Ωt can be found recursively as
Ωt =
{
R−1GTrεTrηTr if t = Tr − 2,
R−1(min{Ωt+1, κ}+ εt+1)Gt+1ηt+1 if t < Tr − 2.
Proof. Deﬁne Et[·] as the worst-case expectation given information in period t and note that in
the last period of working life, Tr − 1, households must satisfy ATr−1 ≥ 0. In the second-to-last
period during working life, households must then leave a positive amount of resources in the
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worst case possible,
ETr−2[MTr−1] > 0,
ETr−2[RATr−2 + YTr−1] > 0,
RATr−2 +GTr−1PTr−2εTr−1ηTr−1 > 0,
m
ATr−2 > −R−1GTr−1εTr−1ηTr−1︸ ︷︷ ︸PTr−2
≡ΩTr−2
.
Combining this with the exogenous credit constraint, κ, end-of-period wealth should satisfy
ATr−2 > −min{ΩTr−2, κ}PTr−2.
In period Tr − 3, households must save enough to insure strictly positive consumption next
period while satisfying the constraint above, in the worst case possible,
ETr−3[MTr−2] > −min{ΩTr−2, κ}ETr−3[PTr−2],
RATr−3 +GTr−2PTr−3εTr−2ηTr−2 > −min{ΩTr−2, κ}GTr−2PTr−3ηTr−2,
m
ATr−3 > −R−1(min{ΩTr−2, κ}+ εTr−2)GTr−2ηTr−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ΩTr−3
PTr−3,
such that end of period wealth in period Tr − 3 should satisfy
ATr−3 > −min{ΩTr−3, κ}PTr−3.
Hence, we can ﬁnd Ωt recursively by the formula in Proposition 1 and calculate the lowest
value of the grid of normalized end-of-period wealth as at = −min{Ωt, κ}.
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D Uncovering Permanent Income Using the Kalman Filter
Here, I give a brief description of the implementation of the Kalman Filter. See, e.g., Hamil-
ton (1994, ch. 13) for a detailed description of the Kalman Filter for time series processes.
Formulating the log income process, on State Space form yields
zit = A+Bxit + vit,
xit = Ct +Dxit−1 + uit,
where
zit = log Yit, A = −1
2
σ2ε , B = 1, vit ∼ N (0, σ2ε),
xit = logPit, Ct = −1
2
σ2η + logGt, D = 1, uit ∼ N (0, σ2η),
and Yit is observed household income, Gt, σ
2
ε , and σ
2
η are known (estimated) parameters and
logPit is the unobserved log permanent income, I wish to uncover. For readability, I suppress i
subscripts in what follows.
The Kalman Filter consists of a prediction step and an updating step where - given initial
values, that I discuss below - the prediction step for the process at hand is,
µt|t−1 ≡ E[xt|=t−1] = Ct +Dµt−1|t−1,
= −1
2
σ2η + logGt + µt−1|t−1,
Σt|t−1 ≡ V[xt|=t−1] = DΣt−1|t−1D′ + σ2η,
= Σt−1|t−1 + σ2η,
where =s denotes information known at time s. The updating step is given by
µt|t ≡ E[xt|=t] = µt|t−1 +Kt(zit − µt|t−1 − A),
= µt|t−1 +Kt(log Yt − µt|t−1 +
1
2
σ2ε),
Σt|t ≡ V[xt|=t] = (I −KtB)Σt|t−1,
= (I −Kt)Σt|t−1,
where µt|t = log Pˆt is the estimated log permanent income and Kt is the Kalman gain,
Kt = Σt|t−1(Σt|t−1 + σ2ε)
−1.
For each household, I identify the ﬁrst year observed in the data (denoted t = 0) and use
that observation as initial values for µt|t and Σt|t. Speciﬁcally, I assume that log income is at
its population mean when ﬁrst observed in the data, log Y0 = E[logP0− 12σ2ε +vt|=t], such that
µ0|0 = log Y0 + 12σ
2
ε and Σ0|0 = σ2ε .
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